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ABSTRACT
United States public diplomacy, the business of 
influencing foreign public opinion by generating goodwill 
through informational and cultural programs, debuted in 
Latin America in the 193 0s. Once the government entered the 
field, public diplomacy, the province of the private sector 
for 150 years, would no longer exist for its own sake. The 
government endeavor would set a dual precedent for the 
mission of cultural relations, as an agent of intercultural 
goodwill and as an instrument of foreign policy, and 
establish a tradition that would define and shape U.S.- 
Soviet cultural relations.
Cold War public diplomacy, like its predecessor, was a 
bilateral private-public enterprise, on a shoestring budget. 
But Cold War cultural relations differed from the Latin 
American precedent.
Two major events, World War II and the Cold War, worked 
to transform cultural relations from a blunt instrument 
designed to protect national security and meet general 
needs, to a refined instrument fashioned to achieve specific 
foreign policy goals, as outlined in the 1956 National 
Security Council Directive 5607. In the process, cultural 
relations changed from a defensive tool, an antidote to 
security and cultural problems, to an offensive tool, a 
penetrating force which, through persuasion and propaganda, 
forged both a channel of communication and a pathway for 
information between warring blocs.
One unlikely facet of cultural diplomacy, performing 
arts exchange, acted especially well as a tool to fight 
communism, serving as handmaiden to the achievement of U.S. 
foreign policy objectives.
THE COLD WAR CULTURAL ACCORD: 
HOW THE EAST WAS WON
Frontispiece
"Cold War on the Cultural Front"
New York Times Magazine 
13 April 1958
At Brussels the U.S. and Russia will compete 
for the minds of men with their arts.
From Thursday through Oct. 19 the eyes of the world will be 
on Brussels and its World's Fair. The attendance figures 
are expected to be in the impressive millions but, no matter 
how steeply they mount, millions upon millions will read and 
hear about this international exposition. For it promises to 
be something more than a conventional fair. It will be the 
place where the cold war, fought with the weapons of art and 
drama, music and dance, architecture, books and films, will 
reach a climax.
If a cold war is unavoidable, it is least perilous when 
waged with laughter and beauty, with heart-lifting aspira­
tions and life-giving visions. For the arts do not destroy; 
they create. They remind us that the soul of man is indivi­
sible, no matter what distances and differences there may be 
among nations and their political, economic and social 
institutions.
Because the arts express man's precious inner life, they have 
a special power to exorcise his fears and hymn his hopes.
They can surmount the barriers of languages and frontiers. 
They can be an eloquent ally in the struggle for mutual 
understanding and trust. If you wish to win the good opinion 
and affection of peoples, you will do so more persuasively if 
you show them your artistic achievements than if you display 
your strength or material wealth.
That is why culture has become such a potent force in the 
cold war between West and East and particularly between the 
United States and Russia. Even as the contending giants 
compete for attention in probing the secrets of the atom 
and in conquests of outer space, even as they compete for 
goodwill with their largesse in underprivileged areas, they 
dare not forget the intangible things--the dreams and secret 
murmurings that speak from heart to heart more surely and 
swiftly than a guided missile. That is why the competition 
in the arts will turn the Brussels Fair into an arena the 
like of which the world has not seen.
IFOREWORD
This thesis concerns itself, generally, with the role 
of public diplomacy in international relations, and 
specifically, with the use of cultural diplomacy as a tool 
to fight Soviet communism. During the Cold War, so the 
central argument of this thesis goes, the U.S. government 
used public diplomacy, especially performing arts exchange, 
both to ameliorate East-West tensions and to launch a 
cultural offensive on behalf of specific foreign policy 
goals. The cultural offensive penetrated Soviet society, 
thereby acting on Policy Conclusion 8 in the National 
Security Council Directive 5607. Dated 29 June 1956, the 
policy point called for an "offensive in terms of promoting 
a desire for greater individual freedom, well-being and 
security within the Soviet Union, and greater independence 
within the satellites."1
Public diplomacy consists of two branches, 
informational and cultural. Informational diplomacy 
includes broadcast and print media, libraries, information 
centers, and publications, the conduct of which fell under 
the jurisdiction of the United States Information Agency 
(USIA) after 1953. Cultural diplomacy includes academic, 
professional, and performing arts exchanges, the execution 
of which has been overseen by both the Department of State
1 Appendix A.
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and the USIA.
The U.S. government began its public diplomacy efforts 
in 1938 with the inauguration of the Division of Cultural 
Relations within the Department of State. Until that time# 
cultural relations had been overseen and financed by the 
private sector. The government's 1938 pilot initiative 
debuted in Latin America in response to a perceived threat 
to the national interest, when Nazi propaganda in Latin 
America violated the one hundred year-old Monroe Doctrine. 
During World War WII, the Office of War Information (OWI) 
conducted a campaign of public diplomacy and propaganda on 
behalf of the war effort.
After 1953, with the creation of the USIA, public 
diplomacy became an official and effectual instrument of 
U.S. foreign policy. Under the wing of the Department of 
State, the cultural branch of public diplomacy featured 
performing arts exchange as the central agent in a cultural 
offensive. Interestingly, performing arts exchanges served 
the national interest of each bloc during the Cold War, and 
became a handmaiden that carried out both U.S. and USSR 
foreign policy objectives, especially from 1958 to 1964, the 
time period examined in this thesis.
Given the formidable Soviet propaganda machinery, it is 
not surprising that the USSR was able to use cultural 
diplomacy effectively. The surprise is, given the modesty 
of the United States' commitment and effort, that U.S.
cultural diplomacy could be engaged effectively on behalf of 
U.S. objectives and goals. America's historical reluctance 
to enlist the government in cultural activities, and its 
aversion to anything resembling propaganda, kept government 
involvement to a minimum.
Over a fifty-five year period of official U.S. public 
diplomacy, the relationship of public diplomacy and foreign 
policy has been debated by government officials, academics, 
artists, and those in the commercial private sector. Two 
broad schools of thought have staked out defensible 
positions on the subject. One school holds that public 
diplomacy should serve at the behest of the national 
interest, and function as a tool of U.S. foreign policy.
The other contends that cultural diplomacy should exist to 
improve mutual understanding among peoples, without being 
tied to specific foreign policy objectives.
Public diplomacy as it has evolved is actually both.
It has officially and traditionally been heralded as an 
agent of international goodwill. But it has also been 
marshalled to protect the national interest and promote 
foreign policy goals. Certainly during U.S.-Soviet Cold War 
relations, public diplomacy served in both capacities, 
neither of which is easily quantified for the purpose of 
evaluation. Although the effects of public diplomacy are 
beyond precise measure, this thesis looks at three factors 
in order to gauge the effects of the effort and to argue
6that it constituted a small but important part of Cold War 
foreign policy strategy: the origin, evolution, and fate of 
public diplomacy from its Latin American debut through the 
mid Cold War; the relationship of public diplomacy to 
propaganda; and the use of public diplomacy as an instrument 
of foreign policy in a case study of U.S.-Soviet Cold War 
cultural relations from 1958 to 1964.
Chapter Two offers an introduction to public diplomacy, 
a kind of definition-in-progress that spans fifty-five 
years. Between 1938 and 1993, public diplomacy was 
reinvented in accordance with changing vogues in foreign 
policy regimes. Consequently, public diplomacy has been 
defined as both informer and persuader, as a tool of 
persuasion and an agent of good will.
In a brief historical overview that lays the foundation 
for the thesis argument, Chapter Three looks at the origins 
of public diplomacy and tackles the subject of its 
relationship to U.S. foreign policy objectives. Beginning 
with the 1938 Latin American Experiment, public diplomacy 
assumed a dual mission-- f ostering goodwill and furthering 
foreign policy goals.
Chapter Four charts the evolution of public diplomacy. 
The use of propaganda during World War II and the Cold War 
transformed public diplomacy from a defensive to an 
offensive foreign policy tool.
Chapter Five contemplates the fate of public diplomacy,
7and introduces a case study from U.S.-Soviet relations, 
1958-1964. Looking at histories, philosophies, and 
objectives of U.S.-Soviet cultural relations, and comparing 
them to the Latin American precedent, the analysis concludes 
that cultural diplomacy in the Cold War assumed prominence 
because it provided a means by which each bloc could pursue 
its foreign policy goals. The American debate over 
engagement in official cultural relations, which caused 
internal wranglings in the executive and legislative 
branches and threatened the life of public diplomacy, was 
resolved by the Cold War need to counter Soviet anti- 
American propaganda. Subsequent support of public diplomacy 
by the American executive, American popular press, and 
American public, and directives from the National Security 
Council, sealed its fate as a player in the foreign policy 
arena.
Continuing the case study, Chapter Six examines "The 
Big Swap,1 both informational and cultural diplomacy, in 
U.S.-Soviet Cold War relations. Informational exchanges, 
which include national exhibits, print and electronic media, 
and professional people-to-people exchanges, were not as 
successful for the U.S. as hoped, because Soviet tactics 
caused persistent problems with reciprocity, travel 
restrictions, and the censoring and jamming of information. 
It remained for cultural diplomacy, especially performing 
arts exchanges, to pick up the diplomatic slack. Cultural
8exchanges were much less likely to be suspect tools of 
foreign policy, whereas informational programs could easily 
be misconstrued as pure propaganda. Ironically, cultural 
diplomacy, long relegated to diminutive status by 
informational and traditional diplomacy, kept an auxiliary 
line of diplomacy open between the warring blocs, thereby 
serving the very forces by which it had been marginalized 
historically.
Chapter Seven argues that cultural exchanges were an 
arena in which U.S.-Soviet interests dovetailed, and 
therefore became a Cold War exchange of choice. Performing 
arts exchanges were a foreign policy coup for each bloc, 
helping each achieve foreign policy goals. The Soviets were 
able to project a favorable image to the world and gain 
American dollars. The U.S. gained access to Soviet soil, 
and, according to a vision initially advanced by Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles, gained a way to infuse ideas 
and information into the Soviet Union.
Each side benefitted from performing arts exchange, but 
the U.S. in particular was able to launch a cultural 
offensive and to enact a positive, non-threatening foreign 
policy that infused American ideas into Soviet society, as 
called for in National Security Council Directive 5607. 
Without the relief of East-West cultural exchange, the 
continual crises in U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold 
War--the U-2 incident, the Berlin Crisis, the Bay of Pigs,
9and the Cuban Missile Crisis--would have been unbearably 
tense. Without the cultural offensive, U.S. foreign policy 
would have been inadequately limited to the defensive 
strategy of containment, falling short of directives in NSC 
5607.
Thus, cultural diplomacy, long associated with long­
term, intercultural understanding and goodwill, was engaged 
by the U.S. government to effect its short-term critical 
foreign policy goals, as listed in NSC 5067. The popular 
press, unofficial thermometer of the East-West Cold War 
climate, spread word of the success of this cultural 
offensive, enabling public diplomacy to do what it has been 
designed to do, favorably influence public opinion, in both 
the U.S. and USSR.
II
Life Magazine 
28 April 1958
"Ambassadors Trying to Get Summit Show 
Also on the Road"
After the people-to-people preliminaries, the 
diplomat-to-diplomat preliminaries of the most 
important East-West show of all--the summit 
meeting--finally inched onto the road. The 
West challenged the Soviets to take presummit 
negotiations out of the realm of public 
propaganda into that of private talks. Within 
24 hours, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko 
began holding secret sessions with the French, 
British and U.S. envoys in Moscow.
The Western initiative recovered some of the face 
the West had lost by its clumsy handling of the 
summit propaganda issue. But the Moscow meetings 
did not mean the East-West gap was necessarily 
narrowed. Moscow still wanted to rush into a 
summit propagandathon. The West still insisted 
that a meeting of the chiefs of state be care­
fully prepared so that it could really achieve 
something.
Even while receiving the Western ambassadors, 
Gromyko took time out to make a distorted 
charge that nuclear-armed U.S. bombers were 
threatening the U.S.S.R. The U.S., denying the 
accusation, met it head-on by welcoming its 
prompt examination by the U.N. The West wanted 
to make sure that progress toward the summit 
main performance would not be diverted by 
Gromyko's propaganda sideshow.
THE DEFINITIONS
For a century and a half, the United States turned its 
nose up at public diplomacy, the business of influencing 
foreign public opinion by generating goodwill through 
informational and cultural programs. Although U.S. 
diplomacy dates to the efforts of luminaries such as 
Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, public diplomacy, 
long associated with the questionable business of 
propaganda, never got off the ground until the 1930s. Then, 
in response to a dual imperative-- to counteract unwelcome 
foreign propaganda in the hemisphere and to build hospitable 
relationships among peoples of the Americas1--the U.S. 
rethought its attitude toward propaganda, and dabbled in 
public diplomacy. The Division of Cultural Relations within 
the Department of State was formed in 1938 to oversee all 
official cultural affairs.
"The U.S. was the last of the major powers to develop a 
government program in the cultural field,1,2 say public 
diplomacy experts, Charles Thompson and Walter Laves. In 
1953, fifteen years after its initial experiment in public 
diplomacy, and in response to the Cold War, the U.S. founded
XJ. Manuel Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings of U.S. 
Cultural Diplomacy, 1936-1948, Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 1976, 67.
2Charles Thomson and Walter H.C. Laves, Cultural 
Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana U. 
Press, 1963), 31.
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the United States Information Agency, a government organ 
officially dedicated to dispensing U.S. public diplomacy.
Public diplomacy is a many-spendoured thing, and a host 
of definitions compete to capture its essence. It has been 
altered by different administrations, as each attempted to 
enlist public diplomacy in the service of its own 
objectives, shaping its definition to various ends: as 
cultural relations,3 as cultural diplomacy,4 as a word war 
of propaganda,5 as part of a correlation of forces in a 
cultural offensive,6 as a war of ideas,7 as a means of 
Communicating With the World and as President Truman's 
Campaign of Truth,8 as psychological warfare during the 
Eisenhower years, and as an opportunity to "tell America's 
story to the world."9
Definition-in-Progress
Historically, the term public diplomacy, a 20th-century
3Espinosa, vii.
4Frederick Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Offensive 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Press, 1960), 5.
5Thomas Sorensen, The Word War: The Story of American 
Propaganda (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 11.
6Richard F. Starr, Editor, Public Diplomacy: USA versus 
USSR (Stanford, CA.: Hoover Press Publication, 1986), ix.
7Frank Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge U. Press, 1981), 2.
8Hans Tuch, Communicating with the World (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, Inc., 1991), 3.
9Allen C. Hansen, USIA: Public Diplomacy in the Computer 
Age, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 5.
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neologism, arose to describe an activity that has, more or 
less, coincided with a growth in communications in the last 
half of the 20th century.10 The term is attributed to Dean 
Guillion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy who 
initially defined it, in 1965, as a 1 transnational flow of 
information and ideas," a rubric grand enough to provide 
safe haven for intellectual debate over the nature and 
purpose of public diplomacy.
Public diplomacy is sometimes described as an exchange
of ideas. "For students of diplomacy," Frank Ninkovich
notes, "cultural relations are first and foremost a
specialized form of statecraft concerned with the management
of intellectual influences in international politics."11
John Reinhardt, first President of International
Communications Agency, the 1978 incarnation of the USIA,
described public diplomacy as "the efforts through which the
U.S. government enters the marketplace of ideas."12 Until
193 8, the U.S. government had left the "marketplace of
ideas" in the invisible hands of the private sector, as
Charles Thomson and Walter Laves explain:
Until 193 8 the United States government had left the 
responsibility for transnational cultural activities in 
private hands. The government had taken no defined 
attitude beyond that of general, if casual, 
encouragement of cultural activities as a phase of
10Ibid. , 221.
1:LNinkovich, 1.
12Hansen, 12 .
14
peaceful cooperation among peoples. Like trade, 
cultural activities were viewed as predominantly private 
in character, though they could be helped or hindered by 
government action; essentially reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous; directed toward non-governmental ends but 
presumably consistent with the objectives of foreign 
policy.13
In its unabridged theoretical version, public diplomacy
was formally defined in 1965 by Edmund Guillion, former
American diplomat and dean of the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, as follows:
The role of the press and other media in international 
affairs, cultivation by governments of public opinion, 
the non-governmental interaction of private groups and 
interests in one country with those of another, and the 
impact of these transnational processes on the 
formulation of policy and the conduct of foreign 
affairs.14
In practice, "public diplomacy complements and reenforces 
traditional diplomacy by seeking to communicate with peoples 
of other nations,"15 said then Deputy Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher, circa 1977. It supports traditional 
diplomacy through cooperation and competition. In the Cold 
War, for example, public diplomacy allowed warring blocs to 
cooperate and compete through exchanges of ballet companies, 
symphonies, and theatrical companies.
Public diplomacy has meant cooperation between states. 
According to scholar and diplomat Hans Tuch, public 
diplomacy has brought cooperation "because of a need for a
13Thomson-Laves, 28.
14Tuch, 8.
15Hansen, 3 .
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long-term process requiring credibility and deep 
understanding among cultures."16 In the tense and 
dangerous years of the Cold War, any improvement in 
relations between the superpowers required that they 
cooperate in certain ways. Public diplomacy has also meant 
competition. As Frederic Barghoorn, diplomat and Yale 
University professor of law, sees it, "Cultural diplomacy is 
the manipulation of cultural materials and personnel for 
propaganda purposes," and is useful in "inducing others to 
behave in a way in which they would not behave in its 
absence."17 Cold War cultural diplomacy induced the Soviet 
Union to open its society to alien influences, and, 
incidentally, induced a reluctant U.S. to stage a cultural 
offensive.
Often, mistakenly, public diplomacy is associated only 
with competition and propaganda, in the pejorative sense.
But public diplomacy is a mix of the competitive and 
cooperative--of, for example, propaganda and information.
For diplomat Thomas Sorensen, a party to Cold War cultural 
diplomacy, there is no conflict between the competitive and 
cooperative roles of public diplomacy. He claims that the 
U.S. government's information campaign had to include 
propaganda in order to succeed:
16Starr, 154.
17Barghoorn, 10.
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When I joined the U.S. Government's foreign information 
program in 1951, I did not consider my colleagues and 
myself to be "propagandists." We were disseminating 
only "information" designed to "tell America's story to 
the world," and our hope was that if others could come 
to know us better they would learn to appreciate, 
respect, and sometimes even love us. I was wrong:...I 
found that we had to make a case for our views, as 
others, were doing. We had to be advocates, persuaders-- 
propagandists.18
NSC 5607
At the end of the day, public diplomacy earns its wings
only when it performs according to official definitions and
directives. In 1956, National Security Directive 5607 (NSD
5607) directly tied cultural relations to foreign policy
objectives. In Policy Conclusion 8, the document described
how public diplomacy could function as an offensive policy
in fighting the Cold War:
Our foreign policies are necessarily defensive, so far 
as the use of force is concerned. But they can be 
offensive in terms of promoting a desire for greater 
individual freedom, well-being and security within the 
Soviet Union, and greater independence within the 
satellites. In other words, East-West exchanges should 
be an implementation of positive United States foreign 
policy.19
Influencing public opinion and behavior through cultural 
diplomacy may ring lofty, but it is compatible with 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' vision of liberating
18Sorensen, 154.
19NSC 5607, "Statement of Policy by the National Security 
Council on East-West Exchanges: General Considerations,"
29 June 1956, 4. (Please see Appendix A).
17
the communist peoples through non-violent means.20
NSD 5607 continued to govern East-West exchanges 
throughout the Cold War. Within that time, however, 
changing administrations and foreign policies would 
emphasize either cooperation or competition. Early in the 
Carter years, for example, then Deputy Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher, laid out the purposes of public 
diplomacy, all of which stressed cooperation over 
competition, and four of which could easily have been 
written in the 1930s, when the U.S. launched its Latin 
American cultural relations initiative:
1. To insure that other nations more accurately 
understand this country, its values, institutions, 
and policies.
2. To insure that our understanding of other nations 
and of our interrelationship with them is informed 
and accurate.
3. To insure that mutual understanding is bolstered by 
collaborative individual and institutional 
relationships across cultural lines.
4. To insure that as the international policies of our 
Government are formed, we take into account the 
values, interest and priorities of publics abroad.
There is no mention of fighting communism or winning the 
Cold War here. Five years later, however, in 1983 during 
the Reagan administration, an official cultural manifesto. 
National Security Directive 77 (NSDD-77), once again spoke
of a "cultural offensive." Public diplomacy, the document
20Dulles Statement on Liberation, January 15, 1953, 
Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United 
States Senate, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, on the Nomination 
of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State-Designate 
(Washington, D.C., 1953), 5-6.
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declared, included 1 those actions of the government designed 
to generate support for our national security 
objectives."21 This directive, too, might well have been 
written in the 1930s, during the Latin American initiative.
Interestingly, public diplomacy has been seen as both a 
cultural offensive and an agent of cultural understanding. 
The domain of public diplomacy is also seen, according to 
Ninkovich, as either a fringe area of diplomacy or as the 
totality of relations between culture: "Although cultural 
relations are a minor form of diplomacy, at the same time 
the entire foreign policy process is itself subordinate to 
large cultural dynamics."22 When public diplomacy operates 
as an agent of cultural understanding, it seems to occupy a 
fringe area of diplomacy. But when public diplomacy has 
acted in support of the national interest as a cultural 
offensive, as it did in the early Cold War, it embodied what 
Ninkovich called the totality of cordial relations between 
cultures. Thus, Cold War artistic exchanges, acting as 
participants in a cultural offensive and surrogates for 
warring cultures and world views, gained unusual prominence 
during the Cold War. The stakes were high when Russian and 
American ballet companies and symphonies performed on each 
other's soil, because they were representatives not only of 
aspects of national culture but of competing world views.
21Tuch, 7.
22Ninkovich, 2.
19
Today/ diplomats acknowledge that cultural exchange 
is vital because foreign policy, which takes place in a 
broad cultural context, may be implemented more easily when 
accompanied by efforts toward intercultural understanding. 
John Tuthill, former Ambassador to the European Community 
and Brazil, relates that he now knows that he could have 
attached more importance to cultural diplomacy, because it 
is so essential to relations between nations.23 During the 
Cold War, cultural exchange was essential to, and 
indispensible in, East-West relations as a forum for 
cooperation through healthy competition, and as a lifeline 
that kept U.S.-Soviet relations alive, if not well.
23Interview with Ambassador John Tuthill, June 1992.
Ill
Time Magazine 
August 8, 193 8
THE CABINET: Culture Division
No secret to the U.S. State Department has been the 
penetration, economic and intellectual, of the German 
and Italian dictatorships in Latin America. Secretary 
Hull's reciprocal trade treaties with Latin America are 
a move to meet Europe on economic grounds....
Except for Franklin Roosevelt's sensational selling 
tour in 193 6, however, the U.S. has been too sensitive 
to the cry of imperialism at home and abroad to 
organize a U.S. export trade in ideas.
Not without misgivings Assistant Secretary of State 
George S. Messersmith appeared two months ago before 
the House Appropriations Committee to ask Congress 
to enable his Department to do something "we would 
perhaps prefer not to do."
What Mr. Messersmith asked for and got was money to 
establish two new State Department cells, a Division 
of Cultural Relations and a Division of International 
Communications, both aimed straight at "relations 
with our Latin American republics.1
Last week Secretary Hull and Under-Secretary Welles 
announced that the Division of Cultural Relations 
will be launched forthwith. Duties: "The exchange 
of professors, teachers, and students... cooperation 
in the field of music, art, literature... inter­
national broadcasts...generally, the dissemination 
abroad of the representative, intellectual and 
cultural work of the U.S." First year's appropria­
tion: $27,920.
The modest size of the kitty, said Mr. Welles, was 
proof that the new Division "is not a propaganda 
agency."
Chief Cherrington's immediate job will be to wheedle 
more money from private and educational sources, 
prepare an impressive intellectual splash....
THE DEBUT
All of the classic hallmarks of U.S. public diplomacy 
are cited in this 1938 Time article: its joint private- 
public arrangement; its bilateral, exchange aspect; its 
sensitivity to the issue of propaganda and charges of 
imperialism; its modest scale; its tentative tone; and its 
trafficking in culture and ideas with an intent to address 
national security and foreign policy goals.
With all of the misgivings that persist fifty-five 
years later, the U.S. government threw a modest amount of 
caution to the wind, and constructed the Division of 
Cultural Relations within the Department of State in 1938. 
The Division, with the Office of Education, was to carry out 
two programs: informational activities, including overseas 
print and electronic media efforts, libraries, information 
centers, and publications; and cultural programs, including 
educational, professional, and artistic exchanges.
Although worldwide in concept, U.S. public diplomacy, a 
new dimension in the State Department's diplomatic 
repertoire, was initially limited to inter-American cultural 
exchange, as part of the Pan-American movement, at the 
behest of the Roosevelt Administration.1
Overview
Even so, why did the U.S. government become involved in 
public diplomacy at all, if it had kept a 150-year-old
1Espinosa, 67-86.
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distance from this instrument of persuasion? Until the 
1930s, J.D. Parks explains, "cultural relations as an 
instrument of foreign policy was still alien to Washington's 
thinking."2 The United States became aware of the 
potential of cultural relations, beginning in 1898, during 
Pan-American cultural exchange programs overseen by private 
organizations.3 It was not until fifty years later, 
however, that the U.S. government made a decision to take an 
initial foray into uncharted territory. The 1938 debut 
established a precedent for a dual mission, public diplomacy 
as an agent of international goodwill and as an instrument 
of U.S. foreign policy, with a direct relationship between 
the two: cultural relations were to be used as a peaceful 
means to reverse intercultural hostilities of long duration 
among peoples of the Americas and to offset Nazi propaganda 
in the Western hemisphere. From the start, cultural 
relations were tied to national interest and were never used 
solely as apolitical vehicles for the exchange of 
information and culture for its own sake.
During the Cold War, cultural relations would perform 
in like fashion, but on a grander scale, with refinements 
that would tie cultural relations to specific foreign policy
2J.D. Parks, Culture, Conflict and Coexistence: American
and Soviet Cultural Relations, 1917-1958, (Jefferson, N.C.: 
McFarland, 1983), 31.
3Espinosa, 7.
23
objectives outlined in National Security Council directives. 
The Latin American program addressed only general conditions 
that threatened national security.
Between the 1938 Latin American Experiment and the Cold 
War, several key events, beginning with World War II, 
changed the timbre of public diplomacy. Once cultural 
relations were included as part of the propaganda campaign 
during World War II, they became instruments of persuasion. 
Having crossed the propaganda threshold, public diplomacy 
then crossed another, becoming an important means for each 
Cold War bloc to achieve specific foreign policy objectives. 
Interestingly, one unlikely facet of cultural relations, 
performing arts exchanges, made a small, but suitably 
dramatic, diplomatic debut as a handmaiden of policy goals.
1938: The Threat and the Response
Buildup of Axis propaganda throughout the hemisphere, 
the precipitating cause of the administration's remarkable 
about-face on public diplomacy, provided formidable fodder 
for change. With the Nazis making inroads in Latin America, 
the U.S. government retired its reservations, scrapped its 
tradition of non-involvement, and entered public diplomacy. 
President Roosevelt fueled the change when he called for 
diplomatic action that would "strengthen the solidarity of 
the hemisphere against the Nazi propaganda onslaught."4
4Ibid., 90, 92.
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The cultural initiative sprang into being in alarmed 
response to a threat to national security. Mutual respect, 
understanding, and tolerance among peoples of the Americas 
were clear concerns. But it was more alarm bells than 
wedding bells that ushered in the pan-American public 
diplomacy accord. As Espinosa tells it: "U.S. diplomats in 
Latin America sensed that Nazi influence was strong among 
large numbers of German immigrants who had settled in Latin 
America [especially in Argentina, Chile, Brazil and 
Paraguay], and that its receptivity throughout the area 
correlated closely with Hitler's impressive successes in 
Europe."5
Why Public Diplomacy?
Three factors--the American executive, a hostile 
foreign power, and conditions that appeared to favor that 
power (a longstanding intercultural malaise between North 
and South America)--conspired to hoist an unlikely 
protagonist, cultural relations, to a position of 
importance. Two decades later, similar conditions would 
prevail during the Cold War.
President Roosevelt, a popular and charismatic leader, 
acted as a vital force in the creation of public diplomacy 
policy. Cultural exchange was selected over other options, 
following a virtual command in Roosevelt's Inaugural Address
5Ibid., 89.
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and Pan-American Day Speech:
Never before has the significance of the words 'good 
neighbor' been so manifest in international relations. 
The essential qualities of a true Pan-Americanism must 
be the same as those which constitute a good neighbor, 
namely, mutual understanding, and through such 
understanding, a sympathetic appreciation of the other's 
point of view. It is only in this manner that we can 
hope to build a system of which confidence, friendship, 
and good will are the cornerstones....6
Following a 193 6 Pan-American Conference for the 
Maintenance of Peace, called by President Roosevelt, and the 
signing of the "Convention for the Promotion of Inter- 
American Cultural Relations," cultural exchanges were begun 
to carry out the presidential promise. Twenty years on, 
with the signing of the 1958 Lacy-Zarubin Agreement, 
President Eisenhower would issue a similar cultural call to 
arms.
A hostile foreign power, Adolph Hitler and the Nazis,
also precipitated a need for cultural relations, as Thomson
and Laves relate in the following anecdote:
The need for more active cultural interchange with Latin 
America was dramatized from a strange quarter. "Nothing 
could be more fitting than a statue of Adolph Hitler in 
the Pan American Union," was the ironic comment of a 
Latin American diplomat early in World War II. "Who 
more has been responsible for drawing the American 
republics closer together?"7
A decade later, an eerily similar impetus would propel a
reluctant American government to continue its public
diplomacy campaign. As Thomas Sorensen tells it, "It was
6Ibid., 69.
7Thomson and Laves, 35.
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Stalin who gave the information program a big boost [in 
1949]."8 Throughout its fifty-five year-long career, 
external crises would promote public diplomacy.
If strong figures and security threats propelled 
cultural relations programs onto the world stage, then the 
programs themselves proceeded to perform according to a 
script that conquered two ills--intercultural distress and 
national security concerns--with one pill. Traditional 
diplomacy alone would have been ineffective in addressing 
problems in the cultural dimension, whereas information 
programs, including overseas broadcasts and libraries, and 
people-to-people exchanges, could reach a broad audience and 
influence foreign public opinion.
A Cultural Solution
A cultural solution, with a strong emphasis on 
promoting messages of peace and understanding, presented 
itself as a clever and practical, if unusual, response to 
national security threats, for two reasons. First, decades 
of unilateral U.S. intervention in Latin America had 
fostered charges of imperialism against the U.S., and 
subsequent antipathies among the peoples of the Americas 
required bilateral solutions in which equal partners 
participated freely in mutually agreed joint activities. 
Second, long-term intercultural malaise, a product of
8Sorensen, 25.
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centuries o£ mutual hostility and distrust, aggravated by 
foreign propaganda, demanded a cultural solution. During 
the Cold War, cultural exchange programs would hold similar 
promise.
In 193 8, the U.S. government recognized the need to
counter charges of imperialism, the root causes of which
dated, formidably, to the 16th century. Espinosa argues:
Up until the last decades of the 18th century, Latin 
America and Anglo America were two separate and hostile 
worlds. They were extensions of three centuries of 
political, religious, and economic rivalry between Spain 
and England, with England determined to frustrate 
Spain's acknowledged world power in the 16th and 17th 
centuries. Religious, cultural, and ideological 
differences provided the rationale for mutual 
ignorance and dislike.9
Unilateral action taken by the U.S. in Latin and
Central America (and the Far East) in the 19th and early
20th-century served further to alienate the two cultures:
The U.S. policy of 'educational reorientation' program 
in Cuba and Puerto Rico after the Spanish-American War 
of 1898, and a similar 'educational reorientation' in 
the Philippines, aroused bitter criticism from leaders 
in a number of independent nations of Latin America.
In the second decade of the 20th century, U.S. foreign 
policy during military occupations of the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti and interventions in Central America 
by the United States, all unilaterally inspired 
"assistance," not mutually planned and developed, did 
not decrease the barriers that continued to exist, and 
which in the course of the 20th century the U.S. 
government falteringly set out to remove.10
After centuries of misunderstanding, and decades of
9Espinosa, 2-3.
10Ibid.
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U.S. intervention/ a prevailing vision of Anglo America, as
seen through the sensibilities of Central and Latin American
peoples, required redress. Thomson and Laves argue:
To the people of Latin America the United States seemed 
distant and alien. At best it appeared indifferent.
The current image of the North American was not that of 
the scholar, the artist, the humanitarian, or even the 
ordinary, understandable human being. It was in the 
popular view that of a vigorous people, but rude and 
crude, avid for money and material goods. Too 
prevalently it was symbolized by the invading marine 
with his trampling boots or the exploiting and 
corrupting capitalist. Such images were made to order 
for the propaganda of Goebbels. They had to be 
corrected and humanized if the people of Latin America 
were to accept the United States as any sort of 'good 
neighbor.'11
The Debut
Bilateral cultural exchange presented itself as the 
antidote to the evils of imperialism and cultural distance, 
due, in part, to the popularity of the Pan-American movement 
which was based on the notion of the co-equality of states. 
"It was the Pan-American movement," Espinosa notes, "which 
opened the way for initiating a multilateral government- 
sponsored inter-American cultural relations program."12 In 
1936, the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American 
Cultural Relations established a cultural exchange program 
which would later serve as a model for Cold War exchanges. 
Among other things, the Convention called for "greater 
mutual knowledge and understanding of the people and
uThomson and Laves, 35.
12Espinosa, 3.
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institutions of the countries represented.1,13 Initial 
activities were limited to educational exchange and 
informational projects.
The cultural programs, with equal exchange between
equal partners, fulfilled the parameters--bilateralism,
reciprocity, and cooperation--governing the goals of U.S.
public diplomacy. Once set, these parameters proved
resilient enough to define and shape a tradition of U.S.
public diplomacy. The principle of reciprocity, for
example, set both a national norm and an international trend
that would influence the Cold War (and beyond):
It is a significant fact of history that as we move into 
the last quarter of this century the officially 
sponsored international cultural relations programs of 
the vast majority of the countries of the world 
emphasize the principle that cultural relations should 
not be competitive but reciprocal, a promising trend 
toward a new level of cooperation founded on common 
interests and goals.14
Diplomacy on a Shoestring
According to plans, the Division of Cultural Relations 
was supposed to be responsible for a host of activities, a 
grand vision that was continually checked by budgetary 
constraints:
The Division of Cultural Relations was responsible for 
international activities relating to the exchange of 
professors, teachers, and students; libraries; music, 
art, and literature; international radio broadcasts; 
and in general the dissemination abroad of the
13Ibid.
14Ibid., ix.
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representative intellectual and cultural works of the 
United States and the improvement and broadening of 
the scope of our cultural relations with other 
countries.15
Actual Congressional appropriations, totalling $75,000 in 
193 9, meant that, of all the activities listed, the budget 
only covered expenses for professor and student exchanges 
and translations of official publications of the Department 
of State.16 Music and art exchanges were temporarily 
tabled in order "to give precedence to more essential work." 
Later, the initiative would be expanded to include "exchange 
of publications, artistic exhibitions, radio broadcasting in 
the service of peace, educational films, and the 
establishment of special American libraries and reading 
rooms, all designed to strengthen closer ties among the 
peoples of the hemisphere."17 Educational exchange 
received priority, however, and over time the program 
expanded greatly, in Latin America and around the globe, as 
recorded in an Institute of International Education (HE) 
report:
In 1939-1940 there were an estimated 6,670 foreign 
students enrolled in U.S. colleges and universities; at 
the end of the war, in 1945-46, the total was 10,341; 
and with the great influx from all parts of the world 
after the war, by 1948-1949, the total was over 26,500. 
Between 1939-1940 and 1948-49, Latin American students
15Press Releases, Vol XIX, No.461, July 30, 193 8 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939), 66.
16Espinosa, 124, 132.
17Ibid., 124, 132, 129.
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increased from 1,023 to 5,820.18
Since the beginning, cultural relations have 
constituted diplomacy on a shoestring budget. Almost every 
treatment of the subject bears testimony to the fact that 
public diplomacy has been continually under-appropriated, 
partly because it lacks a constituency. As early as 1940, 
journalist Lewis Hanke of Harper's reported that, while 
Congress voted some billions for defense, it slashed the 
cultural budget in two. The appropriation for cultural 
relations approximated the cost of one gun sighter on a 
battle ship.19 In 1958, The New York Times reported that 
the 1959 allocation for cultural programs equalled 
$2,415,000, and that "a single intercontinental ballistic 
missile cost $2, 000, 000 .1,20 In 1961, W.H.C. Laves 
complained that "the program has operated for 7 years at the 
annual level of expenditures established in 1954, in spite 
of several significant developments which clearly call for 
increased financial resources.21 Two score and four years 
later, during the Reagan years, when cultural relations
18Institute of International Education, Thirtieth Annual 
Report of the Director (New York: Oct.l, 1949), 131-133.
19Louis Hanke, "Plain Speaking About Latin America," 
Harper's, 1940.
20,,U.S. Role in the Arts is found to Have Increased in 
Decade since World War II," The New York Times, 1A, 5C.
21Toward a National Effort in International Educational 
and Cultural Affairs, a report prepared by Walter H.C. Laves, 
at the request of the U.S. Advisory Commisson on Educational 
Exchange, U.S. Department of State, 1961.
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enjoyed something of a renaissance, similar conditions would 
prevail. The U.S. appropriation for public diplomacy--$100 
million for all educational and cultural programs22 to the 
Soviet's $3.5 billion23--may have been sufficient to seal a 
widget in a Star Wars rocket. In a 1991 interview, USIA 
officer Richard Kaplan verified that the USIA had been given 
$2 million for all 1991 performing arts exchanges.24
A Private-Public Affair
The U.S. approached public diplomacy tenuously and 
experimentally, and dabbled on a modest scale, because 
cultural diplomacy, long the province of the U.S. private 
sector, was largely funded and controlled by the private 
sector. The government was meant to have a secondary role, 
Thomson and Laves tell us: "The Division of Cultural 
Relations was set up primarily to encourage and assist the 
activities of private organizations in transnational 
cultural relations."25 The joint private-public initiative 
required that the U.S. government cooperate with, and often 
take direction from, the major philanthropic, educational, 
and cultural entities of the country. The friction caused 
by the joint effort led to a debate over the issue of
22Budget of the United States Government, 1985, 8-184.
23Starr, ix.
24Interview with Richard Kaplan, USIA, March 1993.
25Thoms on-Laves, 31.
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government involvement in, and regulation of, educational 
and artistic exchanges.
The private sector balked at the alliance of culture 
and foreign policy. With something as basic as a first- 
amendment freedom at stake, artists and scholars involved in 
the exchanges resented any government regulations and 
prohibitions on expression. The State Department found 
itself without policy or precedent, for instance, when 
Frederick Jagel, a well-known tenor, decided to designate 
himself "musical ambassador of good will" to Buenos Aires. 
The department had yet to hammer out the delicate details of 
cultural diplomacy with representatives of the artistic 
community,26 but many private-public exchanges proceeded 
without a hitch. A sampling of the programs includes an 
exchange of journalists planned by Dean Ackerman of Columbia 
University, American Library Association exchanges jointly 
funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and the State 
Department, and a 1938 Women's Pan American Good Will 
Congress in Houston. For a thorough and comprehensive 
listing of exchanges among countries in the Americas, 1938- 
1953, see Inter-American Beginnings of U.S. Cultural 
Diplomacy: 1938-1948, J. Manuel Espinosa's superb and 
definitive text on the subject.
Many in government agreed that the government should 
not seek to control the content of exchanges, and that the
26Espinosa, 93-4.
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"artistic diplomats" should serve as cultural, not 
political, representatives of the nation. Ninkovich writes: 
"The State Department's perception of a causal connection 
between intellectual liberty and a democratic social order 
originally caused the founders of the Division of Cultural 
Relations to segregate cultural from political affairs,"27 
a view supported by Thomson and Laves. "Some officers of the 
Division of Cultural Relations and their private advisers 
were chary of adopting any 'ulterior' objective for a 
program of cultural relations, [believing that] any implica­
tion of a tie-in between cultural interchange and foreign 
policy invalidates the effect of cultural activities."28
Others, turning the tables, resented the private
sector's strong voice in the exchanges, and worried that the
government was so hamstrung by its own prohibitions and
budgetary constraints that the benefits of the program would
be significantly compromised:
The Division [of Cultural Relations] was set up in a 
political department of the government and was designed 
to serve a political purpose. Yet the Division found 
itself hedged in at almost every turn by prohibitions; 
there were so many activities it could not engage in.
And it languished for lack of funds. At a time when 
good-will bomber flights were made to Latin America 
at the drop of a hat--well, at least every time a 
president was inaugurated there--the Division is forced 
to talk big and do little because money was lacking.29
27Ninkovich, 171.
28Thomson-Laves, 43.
29Hanke, 591.
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From the outset, the American public diplomacy program
was complicated by a duality of purpose, a tension between
persuasion and altruism, a condition that was aggravated by
the private-public arrangement and modest budget. As told
by Thomson and Laves:
During this initial period two divergent views emerged 
as to the relation of the governmental program of 
cultural relations to United States foreign policy. One 
argued that the program should be valid in its own right 
and not viewed as an instrument for forwarding political 
and economic policy. The other considered it as inevi­
tably and closely linked to phases of foreign policy.30
Cultural Relations and Foreign Policy
In 1939, cultural relations functioned as a practical 
tool for forging peace in the face of formidable cultural 
obstacles. Cultural relations, touted as "one of the most 
practical means of developing peace in the American 
Republics" and of forging "a public opinion which would 
favor and support a rule of peace," were used as peace 
machinery.31 Secretary of State Hull billed the new 
cultural relations programs--student and professor exchanges 
with Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Guatemala--as a 
"Way to Peace on the American Continent."32
Cultural relations would continue to be thought of as 
peace machinery into the Cold War. But as the concept of
30Thomson and Laves, 43.
31Espinosa, 79.
32Ibid., 80-81, 86.
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peace itself became tainted with duplicity, with the Soviets 
insisting that they were the doves of peace, U.S. peace 
machinery rebilled itself as truth machinery, beginning with 
President Truman's Campaign of Truth in 1949.
Conclusion
Once precedents were set in Latin America for the use of 
cultural relations for national security purposes, it became 
difficult to undo the link between public diplomacy and 
national security. Then, as cultural relations were 
included in the propaganda efforts of World War II, it 
became difficult to undo the link between public diplomacy 
and persuasion. Domestic debate notwithstanding, cultural 
relations, following precedent, served the national 
interest.
IV
Newsweek 
27 September 1943
"Beamed to Europe: OWI's Propaganda Paves the Way 
for Military Advances"
Only slightly less important than military preparation 
for the invasion of Europe was the paving of the way by 
the Office of War Information overseas propaganda. Of 
all the OWI's branches, its Atlantic Operations Radio 
Bureau has the most direct contact with the peoples and 
governments of enemy and occupied Europe. With the 
military now actually on its way in, the effectiveness-- 
or the ineffectiveness--of the radio propaganda during 
the last two years will become increasingly evident.
Its worth is, unfortunately, a good deal harder to 
measure than that of a military operation.
Operations: The OWI Atlantic radio barrage has now 
reached the staggering proportions of 2,600 short-wave 
shows a week. These broadcasts keep most of the eighteen 
Atlantic short-wave transmitters running full blast 24 
hours a day. Programs are now being built, recorded, and 
shipped overseas as fast as time can be cleared with the 
foreign stations. Although the shows are designed for 
consumption in the neutral country itself, some, near the 
frontiers of Europe, are heard by the enemy as well.
Policy: Elmer Davis, the director of War Information,
made his over-all propaganda policy clear when he took 
office: The best propaganda is the truth. Thus the 
great majority of OWI overseas programs are straight 
newscasts, only slightly slanted in subject matter to 
fit the country at which they are aimed. The typical 
newscast is fifteen minutes long. It is introduced 
by a brisk band chorus of "Yankee Doodle" and is 
identified as "the Voice of America" (the OWI is never 
mentioned).
Results: Much of the sniping in Congress and elsewhere
against the OWI overseas radio branch is based on the 
claim that there is no certainty that the programs are 
listened to in Europe. To refute this, the Atlantic 
operations office offers such evidence as a recent 
protest from the newspaper Porunca Vremmi, in Nazi- 
occupied Rumania, against 'individuals who from morning to 
evening listen to enemy broadcasts... Unfortunately, those 
harmful individuals are not only out to satisfy their 
morbid curiosity. From one coffee house to another they 
spread their 'news,' thus undermining morale.'
THE DEBATE
The transformation of public diplomacy into a 
cultural offensive is the story of war- - a world war, a Cold 
War, and a virtual domestic war, mostly over the issue of 
propaganda. Over a forty-year span, a debate about the link 
between public diplomacy and propaganda was resolved by the 
practical demands of winning wars. Many in private and 
public life disliked the idea of using cultural activities 
as part of a war effort, but they were used nonetheless. 
During World War II, information programs, especially print 
and electronic media, were the preferred mode of exchange, 
and were used defensively to help win friends and strengthen 
alliances. During the Cold War, the State Department 
ingeniously used cultural programs offensively to penetrate 
and effect changes within the enemy bloc.
This chapter takes a look at definitions of propaganda, 
the debates over propaganda and the polarization of cultural 
exchanges, and how these issues affected the evolution of 
public diplomacy in the period after the 1938 Latin American 
pilot program and before the Cold War.
The Definitions
Information exchange used during World War II qualifies 
as a form of propaganda. Newscasts, in particular, as the 
Newsweek article above reports, were part of the campaign of 
truthful, or legitimate, propaganda intended to inform 
allies and persuade neutral states. The use of propaganda,
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however, has always been controversial in America.
Opposition arose, as also noted in Newsweek, from those who
maintained that the effects of information programs, unlike
military operations, could not be measured, a common
complaint against public diplomacy. Concern also arose over
the use of propaganda in general. Hans Tuch explains:
Propaganda is a perfectly appropriate term if used in 
its original and correct meaning, dating to 17th cen­
tury religious origins. If one thinks of propaganda 
in terms of disseminating ideas and information, there 
is no problem in using this word to describe the U.S. 
government's information and cultural activities 
abroad. But in the English language--at least in 
America--propaganda has acquired a pejorative meaning, 
referring to the deliberate spreading of lies and false 
information.1,1
But propaganda may come in three forms--white, grey, 
and black--according to Allen Hansen. White, or 
"legitimate” propaganda, as used by American public 
diplomats, is defined as "the spreading of true or accurate 
information for what one considers a worthy cause."2 
USIA's information campaign, "Telling America's story to the 
world," was a certain use of legitimate propaganda for a 
worthy cause, spreading the story of freedom round the globe 
and helping to win the Cold War. Many experts in public 
diplomacy defend and support the use of propaganda, or 
persuasion, as justifiable and necessary--in this legitimate 
form. Thomas Sorensen, a thirty-year veteran of public 
diplomacy, has asserted that "the USIA's purpose should be
xTuch, 9.
2Hansen, 6.
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to persuade, not merely to inform."3 Moreover, "public 
diplomats," Allen Hansen contends, "are 'propagandists' in 
the original meaning of 'propaganda,' i.e., advocates of a 
cause--and as such they are 'pioneers' in a relatively new 
profession."4 Frederic Barghoorn, Yale professor and 
former diplomat to the USSR, has matter-of-factly argued 
that cultural programs, much like information programs, 
should function "as the manipulation of cultural materials 
and personnel for propaganda purposes."5
Since many Americans bristle at the idea of propaganda, 
public diplomats have neologized their way round the dilemma 
in something of a domestic propaganda campaign to sell 
public diplomacy to Americans. Therefore, the term, public 
diplomacy, and the inadequate euphemism, information, are 
often used as substitutes for the value-laden term, 
propaganda.6 (Here, the terms public diplomacy, cultural 
diplomacy, cultural relations, and propaganda, in its 
legitimate form, are used interchangeably, although they are 
distinct in meaning. Cultural diplomacy and cultural 
relations are a subset of public diplomacy. Propaganda, of 
course, may embrace all other terms.)
3Sorensen, 25.
4Hansen, 222.
sBarghoorn, 10.
6Starr, 95.
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The Debate over Propaganda
American abhorrence of propaganda, and association of
it with Nazi and fascist regimes, gave rise to a debate
about its use in the shaping of public opinion, both at home
and abroad. As Thomson and Laves explain:
The term propaganda had acquired in the United States 
during the 1920s and 1930s a derogatory meaning. 
Propaganda was looked upon as a dirty business, which 
might be necessary in war but should not be continued in 
peace. It was not considered in accord with the 
traditions of American foreign policy. Moreover, there 
was fear that the apparatus for propaganda abroad might 
be shifted to focus on the American people themselves, 
and become a dangerous instrument in domestic political 
struggles.7
Legislative steps were taken to meet the public's unease
about government involvement in public diplomacy, and all
propaganda efforts were restricted, by law, to overseas
activities. According to Hans Tuch:
Even when the necessity for the U.S. government to 
conduct public diplomacy was accepted, the Congress 
insisted on immunizing the American people from its own 
government's propaganda by limiting the government's 
activities to telling its story abroad. The distinction 
was clear: to this day, the U.S. government's public 
diplomacy programs and products cannot by law be 
disseminated to the American public.8
But, since public diplomacy must legitimately 
propagandize in order to favorably influence foreign public 
opinion, the U.S. government, ever sensitive to Americans' 
distaste for propaganda in general, sought to justify its 
operations, and to answer its citizens' misgivings about the
7Thomson and Laves, 63.
8Tuch, 6.
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enterprise. Beginning in 1938, the U.S. government issued a
series of disclaimers denying the union of public diplomacy
and propaganda, starting with Chief Cherrington's 1938
definitive statement on the newly created Division of
Cultural Relations:
It is not a propaganda agency, in the popular sense of 
the term which carries with it implications of penetra­
tion, imposition, and unilateralism. If its endeavors 
are to be directed toward the development of a truer 
and more realistic understanding between the peoples of 
the United States and those of other nations, it is 
believed that such a goal can most surely be attained 
by a program which is definitely educational in 
character and which emphasizes the essential reciprocity 
in cultural relations....9
According to Chief Cherrington, the reciprocity and the
modest kitty of cultural relations were signs that
propaganda was not afoot. Modest the kitty would remain,
too, for some fifty-five years, as if to perpetuate the
notion that propaganda could not be dispensed on such a
smal1 budge t.
The U.S. government further sought to shield itself
from charges of propaganda and imperialism, both home and
abroad, by its insistence that it was not acting as an
official purveyor of culture. According to a State
Department spokesman in 1940:
The role of governments in promoting friendly individual 
relations among people is necessarily limited. We have 
no 'official culture' to sell to any of our neighbors. 
The idea, in fact, of an official culture is repugnant
9||The Role of Education in International Cultural 
Relations," Department of State Bulletin, I (July 8, 1939), 
490-491.
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to us, and it would be equally repugnant to them. In 
the field of human association the role of a government 
is to encourage, to cooperate, and to coordinate private 
initiative and the initiative of institutions seeking to 
broaden the base of cultural appreciation.10
In an attempt to convince the Congress and public that 
public diplomacy was necessary and legitimate, public 
diplomats dropped the public use of the term propaganda 
because of its association with America's historic enemies. 
In 1938, as previously noted, the Division of Cultural 
Relations denied any tie between cultural programs and 
propaganda. In the 1943 Newsweek article featured at the 
beginning of this chapter, the term propaganda is freely 
used, perhaps because it is considered to be acceptable 
during wartime. By 1962, however, two articles in Time 
magazine, featured in Chapter Six, crowed about the success 
of America's cultural offensive, but made no mention of 
propaganda. But it was propaganda nonetheless, mostly 
because, as Sorensen has noted, it had to be to succeed.
Why else would the government have bothered at all with 
these programs, especially since the private sector had 
managed cultural relations well enough for 150 years? What 
should be the role of public diplomacy if hot to favorably 
influence foreign public opinion to benefit the national 
interest?
Government involvement in cultural exchanges,
10Ellis O. Briggs, "The 1930s--A Decade of Progress in 
Inter-American Relations," Department of State Bulletin, II 
6 January 1940, 10.
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especially educational, professional, and artistic
exchanges, touched off yet another debate on the
politicization of these programs. The first of public
diplomacy's two branches, the informational branch,
consisting largely of broadcasts, pamphlets, publications,
overseas exhibits and libraries, has generally been accepted
as a vehicle for legitimate propaganda. The cultural
branch, however, consisting largely of educational,
scholarly, professional, and artistic exchanges, has not
willingly been accepted as a proper arena for persuasion.
Therefore, informational diplomacy has been linked to
national interests and foreign policy goals, especially
during World War II, while cultural diplomacy has generally
not. The promotion of U.S. interests and the use of
legitimate propaganda go hand-in-hand, according to the
logic, and neither have a place in cultural activities.
Sorensen explains the dichotomy as follows:
Few question the desirability of cultural and 
educational activities abroad, but many question whether 
they should be a part of, or have the same objectives 
as, the information program. Some believe that 
government-sponsored cultural activities, while 
different in method, are identical in purpose to 
information activities: the influencing of foreign 
attitudes to further U.S. policy goals. Others believe 
that cultural activities serve long-range U.S. interests 
in a broad sense, but should not be employed for 
tactical propaganda advantage, that they should be 
separated from propaganda operations so as not to be 
tarnished by them.11
Despite the clarity of the 1963 Sorensen statement, in 1993,
nSorensen, 71.
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Hans Tuch, a public diplomat whose extensive writings about
his career include the definitive text, Communicating With
the World, said that the issue was still contentious:
There are some among my former colleagues who still 
believe that there is something immoral about throwing 
educational and cultural activities into the same hamper 
with the U.S. government's information programs, that 
educational and cultural exchanges are somehow 
antithetical to the foreign relations process and our 
foreign affairs goals.12
As recently as 1986, at a Hoover Institution Conference on
public diplomacy, scholar Nils Wessell argued that linking
politics and cultural diplomacy was objectionable and
unwise: "Linking exchanges to political fluctuations
endangers not only the life of the exchanges, but more
importantly, threatens cessation of the benefits accrued to
the U.S."13
Many other issues over the proper role of public
diplomacy in state affairs have arisen, which, though beyond
the present purposes here, give some insight into the
debate. USIA diplomat Hans Tuch reveals the kinds of
considerations identified by the Department of State, USIA,
Congress, and the executive, during the debate:
Should U.S. public diplomacy address itself to mass 
audiences or to the elites in other countries?
Should U.S. public diplomacy concern itself with long­
term objectives, creating a climate of understanding for 
the United States, or should it concern itself with
12Interview with Hans Tuch, March 1993.
13Starr, 166.
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short-term objectives, such as gaining acceptance for 
intermediate-range nuclear forces deployment in Europe?
Should U.S. public diplomacy use primarily "fast" media, 
namely, information programs involving press, radio, and 
television; or should it work through the "slow" media-- 
cultural and educational exchanges, books, libraries, 
exhibitions?
Should U.S. public diplomacy be primarily concerned with 
countering communist ideology, or should its principal 
objectives be to promote democracy?
Should U.S. public diplomacy represent the policies of 
the incumbent administration, or should it reflect 
American society in its diversity?14
Propaganda and Necessity; How WWII and the Office of War 
Information Shaped the Debate
In 1939, the U.S. Division of Cultural Relations issued
the following declaration about the use of cultural
relations in the event of direct involvement in World War
II: "The Division should be divorced from such propaganda
activities as the Government might find necessary during the
war."15 Disclaimers aside, cultural relations assumed a
mission to persuade as well as inform, and began to function
much like informational programs. It is difficult to
imagine that cultural relations activities could have
continued unfettered throughout the war, and once the
propaganda threshold was crossed, reversal was unlikely.
Thomson and Laves elucidate:
The character of the cultural program was modified some­
what to meet the demands of the war situation. Such
14Tuch, 13.
15Espinosa, 142 .
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activities as the exchange of journalists and 
specialists and the overseas libraries were put under 
pressure to produce immediate as well as long-term 
effects. Cultural relations were largely, though not 
entirely, viewed as one more channel for propaganda, or 
at least as preparing the way for propaganda.16
The OWI's efforts, accomplished by a fledging agency 
still sprouting wings, were remarkably successful, given its 
modest budget. "From start to finish," Sorensen reports, 
"OWI's Overseas Branch spent $110,800,000, a tiny fraction 
of the hundreds of billions spent on the war and only 60 
percent of one year's budget of the peacetime USIA in the 
late 1960s."17 In mostly unsung efforts, OWI sought to 
maintain allied morale, weaken the will of the enemy, and 
conspire to shake the enemy's resolve with the following 
successful informational efforts: Victory magazine, printed 
in six languages, shipped bimonthly to all accessible parts 
of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, and Q.S. territorial 
possessions, with total distribution of 540,000;18 OWI's 
"foreign propaganda broadcasts," which short-waved 2,688 
programs (80% news) each week toward the rest of the world, 
with reported reception in Switzerland, Berlin, Rome, Paris, 
Spain and Poland;19 newspapers, such as L'Amerique en 
Guerre; the highly successful leaflets known as "safe-
16Thomson-Laves, 55.
17Sorensen, 19.
18,1 Taxpayer s' Victory." Time, 1 February 1943, 52.
19"Anyone Listening?" Time, 15 March 1943, 50.
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conduct passes" which encouraged honorable surrender of
enemy forces, and the deliverance of the Italian Navy after
repeated and urgent broadcasts by the Voice of America
(VOA) , [and BBC] .20 Moreover, the VOA pulled off at least
one spectacular coup, organized by former OWI official, Leo
Rosten, in which it aired a live broadcast of the bombing of
Berlin and the demise of Radio Berlin as it happened. As
Rosten told Look magazine:
When it appeared likely that Hitler would broadcast to 
the world at 11 A.M., the hour that he became 
Chancellor, [January 30, 1943, Hitler's tenth 
anniversary in power and Roosevelt's birthday] Rosten 
proposed that the RAF bomb Berlin at that precise moment 
and knock the Nazi radio off the air while the world 
listened. The project went off without a hitch. With 
perfect timing, RAF Mosquito bombers hit Berlin a few 
seconds after 11 o'clock. Hitler had a sore throat, but 
Hermann Goering spoke in his place. A few seconds after 
the fat Reichsmarschall began speaking, explosions were 
heard in the background. Shouts and sounds of confusion 
followed, then Radio Berlin went off the air. Germany 
was not invincible, after all.21
In spite of OWI's successes, its activities fell short 
of the expectations of some. Criticism was stern from some 
quarters. Sorensen complained that "OWI used propaganda as 
an instrument of war, but failed completely to develop the 
art of persuasion as an instrument of foreign policy."22 
Frederic Barghoorn bemoaned the failure of the OWI, and the 
U.S. effort in general, to develop cultural diplomacy as a
20Sorensen, 16-19.
21Leo Rosten, "The World of Leo Rosten: The Day I Bombed
Berlin," Look, 8 February 1966, 36.
22Sorensen, 12.
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specialized art: "Cultural diplomacy is so new to the U.S. 
that it is doubtful that we will ever be full-fledged 
practitioners of this art."23
Nevertheless, public diplomacy learned some lessons 
from OWI. Generals Eisenhower and MacArthur had encouraged 
psychological warfare operations in their theaters.24 As 
president, Eisenhower would honor the lessons of propaganda 
by issuing a call for a continuation of "psychological 
warfare" throughout the Cold War.
Cultural Relations in the Post-War Era
Salvos of disclaimers aside, and debate 
notwithstanding, cultural relations in the post-war era 
would enjoy an importance due to a collection of factors. 
After World War II, a series of events, over a dozen years' 
time, enabled public diplomacy to build on the pre-war Latin 
American blueprint. The Fulbright Act of 1946, the Smith- 
Mundt Act of 1948, Truman's 1949 "Campaign of Truth," 
Eisenhower's creation of the USIA in 1953, the Cold War, the 
Lacy-Zarubin Agreement of 1958, and the Soviet propaganda 
campaign, all conspired to hoist cultural relations to 
prominence as a tool of U.S. foreign policy.
The 1946 Fulbright Act called for an exchange of 
students, researchers, and academicians, and led the way to
23Barghoorn, 11.
24Ibid.
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other exchange efforts, including exchanges of youths, 
professionals, trade unionists, and artists. The Smith- 
Mundt Act of 1948, considered to be the legislative origin 
of U.S. public diplomacy, authorized the "preparation, and 
dissemination abroad, of information about the United 
States, its people and its policies through press, 
publications, radio, motion pictures, and other information 
media, and through information and instructors abroad."25
In the Roosevelt tradition, strong heads of state kept 
public diplomacy alive. Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy each 
supported cultural relations. Peacetime redirection of 
propaganda mechanisms and shifts in objectives had been 
attempted by the government soon after World War II, but it 
was not until 1950, with another war at hand in Korea, that 
public diplomacy was redefined by Truman into a "Campaign of 
Truth," the stated objectives of which were "to strengthen 
cohesion among the countries of the free world, to present 
the United States as a worthy partner with whom to 
cooperate, to deter Communist aggression, and to help roll 
back Soviet influence."26 Truman, in an executive order, 
stated that "the nature of present day foreign relations 
makes it essential for the United States to maintain 
information activities abroad as an integral part of the
25Tuch, 17-18.
26Edward W. Barrett, Truth is Our Weapon (New York: Funk 
& Wagnalls, 1953), 78-79.
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conduct of our foreign affairs."27 Truman's Campaign of 
Truth--"to see to it that other peoples receive a full and 
fair picture of American life and of the aims and policies 
of the U.S. Government"--advocated "making ourselves known 
as we really are."28
Eisenhower, on whose watch the USIA would begin, spoke 
favorably of the fruits of "psychological warfare," and 
acknowledged that propaganda had contributed to the war 
effort: "The spoken and written word was an important 
contributing factor in undermining the enemy's will to 
resist.... Psychological warfare has proved its right to a 
place of dignity in our military arsenal."29
Interestingly, President Eisenhower initiated the 
change in peacetime cultural diplomacy from the defensive to 
the offensive. In his 1953 directive, Eisenhower switched 
from speaking of psychological warfare as a useful line of 
defense during wartime, to speaking of a subtly offensive 
means of communication that would ally the U.S. with other 
non-communist nations. He instructed the newly created USIA 
"to submit evidence to peoples of other nations by means of 
communication techniques that the objectives and policies of 
the United States are in harmony with and will advance their
27Executive Order 9608, issued by President Truman, 
31 August 1945.
28Tuch, 115.
29Sorensen, 20.
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legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace."30 
Instead of using information to undermine the enemy's will 
to resist, it would be used to encourage cooperation.
As late as 1961, with passage of the Mutual Educational 
and Cultural Exchange Act, popularly known as the Fulbright- 
Hays Act, "mutual understanding" was still described as the 
main goal of cultural relations,31 but President Kennedy 
altered the mission of public diplomacy to one of helping 
"to achieve United States foreign policy objectives 
by...influencing public attitudes in other nations."32 
Kennedy's presidential directive, which spoke of 
influencing, rather than informing, officially married 
peacetime cultural relations to foreign policy goals.
Kennedy's directive had some staying power throughout 
the Cold War. The ideas that public diplomacy and cultural 
relations must be related to policy to be effective, and 
must persuade as well as inform, put the enterprise on solid 
enough policy ground to contribute to fighting the Cold War.
Conclusion
At the end of the day, powerful and popular heads of
30Statement by the President, The White House, 28 Oct, . 
1953; and "Directive-Approved by the President for the 
Guidance of the United States Information Agency," 28 October 
1953, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States-- 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, National Archives and Records 
Service (Washington, D.C., 1960), 728.
31Hansen, 19.
32Sorensen, 21.
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state, would intervene to settle a debate that could have 
indefinitely hamstrung the public diplomacy effort.
Domestic quibbles over the fate of public diplomacy in the 
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, were overtaken by events and 
overridden by chief executives who marshalled action, as 
Roosevelt had in the 1930s. Additionally, Khrushchev, as 
Stalin and Hitler before him, prodded a timid America toward 
a cultural commitment. In a 1957 interview on Face the 
Nation, Khrushchev announced that two things, eliminating 
trade barriers and increasing the level of cultural 
exchanges, would help to normalize relations between the two 
superpowers. "There must be," Khrushchev decreed, "more 
contacts between our peoples, between businessmen. That is 
the main thing."33
For better or worse, as early as 1958, with the signing 
of the Lacy-Zarubin Agreement and the advent of official 
U.S.-Soviet cultural exchange, public diplomacy permanently 
changed its spots. Then, the new policy of Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles favored U.S.-Soviet contact that 
would allow the U.S. "to infuse ideas and information into 
the USSR." The State Department began to use cultural 
exchange as a means to an end, and much like its Soviet 
counterpart, turned its cultural relations program, now 
officially worldwide, into "a tool to fight communism.1,34
33Parks, 166.
34Ibid., 4.
VU.S. News & World Report 
26 March 1954
Interview with Theodore C. Streibert 
"The New /Voice of America'"
Q: People generally think of your agency as the Voice of 
America, don't they, Mr. Streibert?
A: Yes, that's true. But, the phrase "Voice of America" 
applies only to our radio operations. Our radio service is 
an important part of our overseas information program-but 
only a part. We also operate a press service, a motion- 
picture service and information centers throughout the 
world.
Q: What is the basic concept of our Information Agency, as 
you see it?
A: The basic concept is to make known and interpret the 
foreign policies of the United States so that they are 
understood by other peoples in terms that are meaningful to 
them.
Q: How do you accomplish that?
A: We use all communication techniques to submit evidence to 
the people of other nations to show that our objectives and 
policies are not only in harmony with their aims, but will 
actually advance their own legitimate aspirations for peace, 
freedom and progress.
£>: Do you mean that you are just engaged in explaining our 
foreign policies--is that all you are doing?
A: No, that is not all--although that, in itself, is a 
pretty big order. In addition to that, we have the function 
of combating the lies spread by the Communists, to unmask 
their deceitful processes, to set straight our real 
objectives and motives which are deliberately misinterpreted 
by the Communists, to enlist the friendship and support of 
people in other nations who have similar aspirations and 
objectives to ours.
Qz Then you are anxious to put our case before countries 
that are on our side as well as before people who are on the 
other side?
A: That's correct. We view this as a two-purpose operation: 
one, to combat Communist lies; two, to cement closer ties to 
our friends and those who are tending our way and try to 
enlist the aid of the so-called 'neutralists.'
Q: You have other means of getting over your story, besides 
radio, don't you?
A: Yes, but back of the Iron Curtain, only the radio. But we 
should get to the important part of this whole information 
operation. There was some publicity about our libraries 
last spring, but even with all that publicity I think there 
is still a failure to understand that that's part of our 
whole information program.
Q: You still have libraries?
A: We have about 160 libraries all over the world, and they
are more than just libraries. We call them information 
centers. They are cultural centers in that they are the 
center of a program of motion-picture showings, of lectures 
of various kinds, sometimes concerts by artists who are 
available to us, English lessons. In most of them there are 
quite a number of programs--not necessarily daily, but a 
number of events each week at least.
Q: Do large number of people use them?
A: They are universally reported as being jammed most of the 
time. . .
Q: Do any of your leaflets ever get behind the Iron Curtain? 
Is there any way to get them behind there that you know of? 
A: We don't engage in that activity. Of course, some get 
into the Russian zone, both from Berlin and from Vienna.
You probably saw the baby pamphlets that were strung up in 
our Vienna information center. The Russians objected, but 
that was fine--that just gave them more advertisement.
Q: What were these pamphlets?
A: These were pictures of odd baby expressions with anti­
communist captions on them.
£>: Do you give a balanced view of this country, the good and 
the bad?
A: We do in our news presentations, yes. It wouldn't have 
credibility if we didn't. Particularly on the radio.
Qz How much has this program cost?
A: The appropriations have been as high as 120 million 
dollars. Now we are down to 75 million. It is a very bad 
thing to be so inconsistent with this. It's like adverti­
sing and publicity--you have to be continuous to get the 
full effects. To be up and down and in and out is very 
wasteful.
Qz And there is the basic questions of why this should be 
going on anyway. Why should the Government be concerned 
about what other people think about us?
A: That is a very good question and, it seems to me, has a 
very definite answer. As long as we are going to be leaders 
in the free world, we are going to have to have a voluntary 
coalition of support.
THE LEGACY
Cold War public diplomacy built on the Latin American 
precedent in its efforts to break through the cultural 
barriers of fear and hostility/ and to combat unwelcome 
propaganda. As USIA Chief Streibert noted in the US News & 
World Report interview, the informational programs, under 
USIA jurisdiction, were designed to fight communism and win 
friends. Some might say that nothing much had changed since 
the U.S. first entered the public diplomacy arena in the 
1930s. Then, as in the Cold War, perceived threats to 
national interest pressed a reluctant U.S. government into 
an activity which, in the 193 8 words of George Messersmith, 
it "would perhaps prefer not to do."1
Some things did change, however. In twenty-five years, 
the U.S. became increasingly more sophisticated at waging 
what Thomas Sorensen calls a word war, and in developing 
what Frederick Barghoorn labels a cultural offensive. 
Cultural relations in the Cold War gained a specificity of 
purpose, changing from a blunt instrument generally designed 
to promote and protect the national interest in the 1930s, 
into a refined instrument carefully planned and executed to 
advance specific foreign policy goals.
Cultural Relations as a Means to Foreign Policy Ends
Cultural relations in the Cold War assumed prominence
lHThe Cabinet: Culture Division," Time, 8 August 1938, 8.
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because they provided a means by which each bloc could 
pursue its foreign policy goals. While the goals of each 
differed substantially, and perhaps because they did so, 
each bloc had a common interest in cultural exchange as a 
means to achieve them. Listed below are the American goals, 
taken from NSC 5607, and Soviet goals as constructed by Yale 
Richmond, a thirty-year veteran of the Department of State's 
U.S.-Soviet cultural program. While they may seem grand, 
U.S. goals support the claim that cultural relations were 
part of the grand strategy to fight communism.
American Objectives2
1. Open the Soviet Union to Western influences in order to 
change its foreign and domestic policies; promote 
evolutionary changes within the Soviet Union.
2. Remove barriers currently obstructing the free flow of 
information and ideas.
3. Increase the Soviet bloc's knowledge of the outer world 
so that their judgments are based on fact rather than 
communist fiction.
4. Encourage freedom of thought.
5. Stimulate demand for greater personal security for bloc
citizens.
6. Encourage desire for more consumer goods.
Soviet Objectives3
1. Gain access to U.S. science and technology.
2. Receive recognition of achievement in transforming a
backward agricultural country into a modern industrial 
state.
2NSC 5607, 29 June 1956. (Please see Appendix A.)
3Richmond, 4-6.
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3. Demonstrate Soviet achievement, most notably in 
performing arts, as high achievements of the communist 
system.
4. Earn foreign currency (especially through world class 
artists).
5. Promote Soviet views abroad and be accepted by the U.S. 
as a co-equal.
Cold War U.S.-Soviet cultural relations necessarily 
differed from the Latin American cultural exchanges in 
several aspects. First, histories differed. U.S.-Soviet 
cultural relations had enjoyed two centuries of friendly 
cultural relations choreographed by the private sector, 
interrupted only by a period of enmity after 1917. Latin 
and North American cultural relations had suffered centuries 
of enmities, followed by a brief period of cultural 
rapprochement. Second, the scope of the operation changed. 
The sheer magnitude of the totalitarian Soviet propaganda 
system meant that the U.S. government had to increase its 
involvement in cultural exchange, in spite of resistance 
from competing centers of power, including Congress, 
academia, and traditional diplomats within the State 
Department. Third, the nature of the endeavor differed.
U.S.-Soviet exchange required a competitive partnership with 
the very force over which the U.S. sought to triumph, 
whereas the Latin American experiment had consisted of a 
partnership designed to resist an outside force. Hitler and 
the Nazis. Fourth, goals were refined. U.S.-Soviet 
exchange, unlike the Latin American liaison, functioned as a
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means for the U.S. to achieve specific policy objectives, as 
outlined in the 1956 NSD 5607. And last, the medium 
changed. Performing arts exchanges, which each bloc saw as 
means to foreign policy ends, assumed a central role in Cold 
War public diplomacy.
A Legacy of Friendship
In the 1950s, as Washington gradually came to view
cultural relations as tools of both foreign policy and
diplomacy, the United States had acquired some 20 years of
experience in cultural exchange, a certain benefit in
matching cultural muscles with the Soviet state-run
propaganda machine. More importantly, perhaps, the Soviet-
American exchanges had a legacy of centuries of friendship
on which to build a 20th century relationship. Since the
18th century, the U.S. and USSR had enjoyed an amiable
cultural exchange, ruptured only by the Russian Revolution
of 1917. Author and historian J.D. Parks explains the
historical basis for the Cold War accord:
Cultural friendship was even older than political amity. 
Long before the two governments exchanged ambassadors, 
learned men from both countries noted the achievements 
of the other, exchanged information of scientific 
interest and traded memberships in scholarly 
societies.4
Books, music, and performing artists, in addition to 
scholarly and scientific exchange, traveled back and forth 
through the 1800s, with a clear, persistent, pattern
4Parks, 7.
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emerging: while Russian artists entertained American 
audiences, Parks notes, Russians urged their countrymen to 
study and emulate American technological efficiency. The 
pattern would repeat itself in Cold War cultural diplomacy. 
Soviet artists softened up the West even while Soviet 
students and professionals eagerly sought scientific and 
technological know-how. From the 1800s until 1917, Russia's 
greatest artists, many in the field of dance, including Anna 
Pavlova, Fokine, Nijinsky, the Diaghilev Ballet, and the 
Bolshoi Ballet, dazzled American audiences.5
Until the 20th century, neither government actively 
promoted official cultural exchanges, but neither erected 
obstacles either. American heads of state were even known 
to correspond with Russian czars and czarinas. For example, 
in the 1780s, George Washington and John Adams, responding 
to Catherine the Great's request for assistance in compiling 
a dictionary of comparative languages, provided the empress 
with information concerning native American dialects.6
s
Thus, the cultural and educational Cold War exchanges 
had a long-standing legacy on which to build, unlike the 
Latin American exchanges, which toddled off on little 
historical footing. Moreover, the tradition of performing 
arts exchanges proved to be a viable heritage on which to
5Ibid., 8-9.
6Eufrosina Dvoichenko-Markov, "The American Philosophical 
Society and Early Russian-American Relations," Proceedings of 
the American Philosophical Society (December, 1950), 556.
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build, allowing each side to pursue its objectives. The 
USSR showcased its greatness and earned much-desired 
dollars, and the U.S. attempted to open up the USSR, remove 
cultural barriers, and increase the Soviet public's 
knowledge of the outside world.7
20th Century Enmities
If 18th- and 19th- century legacies made cultural 
exchange possible, 2 0th- century enmities made them 
improbable. A tradition of amity notwithstanding, the 1958 
golden egg of cultural exchange could only hatch after 
considerable mutual hostility was overcome.
From 1917 to the 193 0s, in the wake of the Russian 
Revolution, the U.S. upheld a "non-recognition policy" 
toward the USSR. Official Washington did not speak to 
Moscow. The U.S. private sector kept contact, however, 
providing among other things, famine relief and 
technological aid. During Stalinist rule, 1934-1953, 
official recognition between governments was renewed, but 
cultural relations waned, a trend broken only during World 
War II. Stalin increasingly isolated the Soviet people from 
outside contacts and purged Soviet cultural life of western 
influences. He instituted the policy of Socialist Realism, 
an officially sanctioned state art form, and turned the 
nation's cultural organs into weapons to attack bourgeois
7Interview with Irene Carstones, USIA, Cultural Officer 
for U.S.-USSR Cultural Exchanges, 1950s-1980s, March 1993.
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civilization. The U.S. government responded by erecting its 
own barriers, restricting contacts with communists and 
conducting a national anti-communist campaign, thus ensuring 
the estrangement of the American and Soviet people.8 In 
1962, Sergei Romansky, chairman of the Committee for 
Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries in USSR,
complained that, except for the exchange of one actor, there
had been an absolute absence of U.S.-USSR cultural relations 
between World Wars I and II.9
Concomitantly, and ironically, as political relations 
plunged, the U.S. began to change its attitude toward
cultural relations as part of a foreign policy agenda. The
Department of State, the new thinking went, could be used as 
a promotor and coordinator of cultural activities, though 
not as a purveyor of an official American culture. (The 
notion of an American state culture was as much an anathema 
to U.S. officials as, say, a state religion was to U.S. 
founders.) In contrast, all Soviet culture that conformed 
to the state policy of Socialist Realism, was official 
culture. "Washington's desire and ability to manipulate 
cultural contacts for state purposes was limited in relation 
to Moscow's," Parks explains, but "Moscow organized and 
controlled its cultural contacts with foreign nations in
8Parks, 9, 3.
9William Benton, "Should We Continue the Cultural Ex­
changes with the USSR?" Saturday Review, 27 October 1962, 17.
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accordance with state policies and plans,"10 a lopsided
match that would create an interesting cultural contest.
During Stalin's tenure, the U.S. government approached
the USSR with offers of cultural relations, to no avail.
After Stalin's death in 1953, Moscow, as it had in the
1920s, made overtures to Washington for cultural exchange.
A reticent U.S. government acquiesced in spite of incidents
that conspired against it, including an acrimonious 1955
Geneva Conference at which cultural exchange was to have
been inaugurated, the intolerable 1956 Hungarian crackdown,
and domestic debate. After Stalin's death, John Foster
Dulles, an influential American Secretary of State,
propelled American public diplomacy toward the 1958
agreement. Parks tells us:
The only contacts with the Soviets that Secretary of 
State Dulles favored during the fifties, were those that 
allowed the United States to infuse 'ideas and informa­
tion' into the Soviet Union in order to encourage the 
Soviet people to resist their rulers. Washington, 
too, had learned to use cultural relations as a means to 
an end.11
A Clash of World Views
The cultural contest was a form of cultural detente, a 
marriage of convenience, in the sense that each side 
tolerated and accommodated the other in order to meet its 
own needs. While each side approached cultural exchange
10Parks, 3,4.
""Ibid., 4.
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with some trepidation, expectations outweighed risks, and
each willingly submitted to a clash of intellectual
ideologies. Each side took risks in so doing, as Professor
Robert F. Byrnes of Indiana University, an organizer of
academic exchanges, explains:
Academic exchanges raise a dilemma for us because formal 
exchange agreements undermine free trade in ideas, 
increase the role of our government over intellectual 
activity, and grant legitimacy to governments that deny 
the freedoms essential to civilized life. However, they 
raise an even more acute dilemma for the Soviet 
government, desperately eager to obtain advantages from 
cultural exchanges and economic relations but fearful of 
the infections these relationships bring into their 
controlled society and into Eastern Europe as well.12
Each bloc was willing to suspend considerable misgivings,
not only because expected policy benefits outbalanced
possible risks, but also because cultural relations promised
to be a means by which each could promote its world view.
The clash of world views is apparent in the distinct 
objectives of each, as listed on page fifty-seven. If 
ideology is a culture's intellectual style, as Frank 
Ninkovich contends, then the U.S. laissez-faire ideology and 
USSR command ideology led, respectively, to a free 
intellectual interchange and a controlled intellectual 
exchange. The U.S., conforming to what Ninkovich calls the 
cultural idealists, set its objectives according to a 
cardinal conceit that the glorious ideas governing America 
could transcend cultural boundaries and penetrate Soviet
12Robert F. Byrnes, Soviet-American Academic Exchanges, 
1958-1975 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana U. Press, 1976), 120.
65
society. Five out of six U.S. objectives embrace a 
philosophical idealism, and bespeak a confidence that 
enlists cultural exchange to affect great change. "To 
promote evolutionary changes within the Soviet Union," for 
instance, is no small goal.
Conversely, the Soviets' objectives, conforming to the 
beliefs of what Ninkovich calls the cultural materialists, 
for whom "ideas travel by slow freight," principally fixated 
on gains in national prestige and material wealth. Their 
goals embraced a more conventional use of propaganda, 
glorification of the state, whereas the American effort, 
with high moral sonority, rose above state aggrandizement. 
Khruschev's statement, "We will bury you," was borne by the 
U.S. with a cavalier confidence that American ideals would 
triumph, if in small part, through a cultural re-edification 
process. The Soviets, too, had lofty ideas about the triumph 
of their world view, but, as cultural materialists, the goal 
was grounded by preoccupation with state glory. The 
Soviets' prodigiously different attitude toward propaganda 
is reflected in their objectives, evidence of an almost 
shameless quest for national acceptance, wealth, and 
recognition, financed with a billion-ruble enterprise that 
fiscally bested its American counterpart 10 to 1. The 
cultural idealism inherent in the American vision of a 
triumphant world view meant that telling America's story to 
the world--its ideas of freedom and liberty--superseded
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state reification.
Had the objectives of each side not been distinct, 
cultural exchange might not have been so attractive. Had 
the Soviets, for example, wanted to remove barriers to the 
free flow of information, change U.S. internal policy, and 
promote freedom of thought, as the U.S. did, the clash of 
ideologies might have been too apparent to allow 
accommodation.
The Kremlin's materialist ideology necessarily led to a 
congregation of cultural and political affairs, whereas the 
United States' cultural idealism led to a segregation of 
cultural and political affairs. To match the formidable 
Soviet propaganda machine, the U.S. was compelled to 
continue its experiments in cultural exchange, to overcome 
its aversion to propaganda, and to win its domestic battle 
over the politicization of public diplomacy. But 
Washington's resistance to becoming "St. Petersburg on the 
Potomac"13 continued with a persistence that rivalled the 
squabbles during the Latin American experiment, World War 
II, and post-war era. To legitimize its stepped-up Cold War 
public diplomacy, the U.S. government framed its initiative 
in grand, supra-national objectives.
Domestic opposition to U.S. public diplomacy continued, 
from the usual quarters--Congress, a faction within the 
State Department, and the American public. Winning
13Byrnes, 7 .
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Congressional support was always a struggle because public 
diplomacy has never had a large domestic constituency. 
Opposition also recurred over the issue of propaganda, and 
over a certain presentiment that, if the U.S. entered a
-t’
democratic-totalitarian cultural contest with the USSR, it
would be compelled to match the totalitarian cultural
aerobics of the Soviets. Very early in the Cold War, a
23 May 1945, dispatch from George Kennan, Assistant
Secretary of State, who opposed East-West cultural exchange,
cast a cloud of gloom over the fate of cultural exchange
with the Soviets:
Insuperable obstacles confront even the most rudimentary 
cultural interchange. As long as a rigid police control 
effectively shields all but a tiny group of Russians 
from contact with foreign influence, cultural exchanges 
between the Soviet Union and other countries will be 
held to a minimum. It is dangerous to permit the 
impression to grow in American intellectual circles that 
a large increase in cultural contacts is technically 
possible and is favored by the Soviet Government.14
U.S. misgivings were due as much to a laissez-faire 
inclination as to a moral belief that it was politically 
inconsistent to condemn a state but interact with its 
people. Further, the American view of the illiberal Soviet 
relationship between state and individual, and the 
subordination of the individual to the state, led Washington 
to the justifiable view that, not only was the Soviet state 
using its people as pawns to glorify itself, but the 
exchanges could be misperceived as sanctioning the practices
14Ninkovich, 108-109.
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of the Soviet regime. In the end, the hope of benefits to 
the U.S. from people-to-people exchange overrode this 
concern.
A movement was also afoot that favored a confrontation 
with communist propaganda. In the extreme, it came in the 
form of a 2 February 1959 New Leader article by Diana 
Trilling. The Soviet Union had declared "cultural war on 
us," she stated, and "one must proceed with caution and 
acuteness, with the knowledge, indeed, that our lives are at 
stake."15 Likewise, the former Ambassador to the USSR, 
Averell Harriman, is reported to have given the following 
words to the wise: "As important as any fact in the field
of foreign policy today, and perhaps much the most 
important, is the fact that the Russians have declared 
psychological war on the United States, all over the world. 
It is a war of ideology and a fight unto the death."16
Many officials called for "a worldwide offensive to 
expose the spurious intellectual and ideological appeal of 
Communism."17 In spite of Congressional objections that a 
cultural offensive would only impel the Kremlin to further 
obstructionism, the mood was right for a policy change, 
according to Frederick Barghoorn, Press Attache to Moscow, 
from 1943 to 1947:
15Barghoorn, 3 .
16Ninkovich, 135.
17Sorensen, 54.
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There was a growing conviction that, while democratic 
societies could not and would not wish to tailor the 
truth to political ends, they should make a more 
vigorous effort to refute Soviet propaganda distortions 
and to achieve more effective communication with the 
people of communist-ruled lands.18
The National Security Council and Public Diplomacy
With the advent of the USIA in 1953, a subtle
triangular alliance among the executive, the National
Security Council, and the USIA developed. The relationship
worked to strengthen the cause of public diplomacy and
muffle opposition with directives from the National Security
Council, as endorsed by the President:
The President today approved the recommendation of the 
National Security Council that the United States should 
seek exchanges between the United States and the 
countries of Eastern Europe including the USSR along the 
lines of the seventeen point program put forward by the 
Western Foreign Ministers at Geneva in October 1955. 
Although this program was unacceptable to the Soviet 
Government at that time, the President believes that 
such a program, if carried out in good faith and with 
true reciprocity, may now contribute to the better 
understanding of the peoples of the world that must be 
the foundation of peace.19
President Eisenhower effected the change, establishing
a strong link between the USIA and the NSC. According to
Sorensen: "Eisenhower, after urging greater Congressional
support for USIA in his 1955 State of the Union Message,
invited [USIA Chief] Streibert to attend meetings of the
National Security Council as an observer and made him a full
18Barghoorn, 7.
19Press Release from The White House, by James C. Hagerty, 
Press Secretary to the President, June 29, 1956.
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member of the Operations Coordinating Board."20 When asked 
"To whom do you report? Who is your real boss?" Theodore C. 
Streibert, Director of the USIA, replied, respectively, "I 
report to the National Security Council, through that to the 
President. The Security Council is really an advisory body, 
so that my real boss is the President."21
Although Eisenhower often deferred to Dulles, a gradual
shift to a powerful NSC, which would later solidify during
the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon terms, provided needed
support for public diplomacy. Shortly after its inception
in 1947, the NSC began to influence cultural relations,
calling for it to play an active role in foreign policy:
Alive to the apparent crucial role of ideas, in December 
1947 the fledgling NSC called for coordinated 
information programs 7to influence foreign opinion in a 
direction favorable to U.S. interests and to counteract 
effects of anti-U.S. propaganda.7 The demands for an 
active approach grew even stronger a few months later 
when the NSC ordered the State Department to 7 develop a 
vigorous and effective ideological campaign.7 
Militarily and politically, U.S. policy may have been 
operating on the principle of containment, but at the 
cultural level it was speeding toward the apocalypse.22
Clearly, according to NSC-inspired wisdom, containment 
alone was incomplete without a cultural component. On 29 
June 1956, the National Security Council issued NSC 5607, 
"East-West Exchanges," a National Security Council statement
20Sorensen, 82.
21,1 Interview with Theodore C. Streibert: The New 7Voice
of America,7" U.S. News & World Report, 26 March 1954, 64.
22Ninkovich, 135-136.
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of policy. As Yale Richmond argues, "This document, couched 
in the Cold War rhetoric of the time, was to serve, without 
revision, as the basic U.S. government policy statement on 
East-West exchanges through the 1970s, and perhaps 
beyond."23 NSC 5607 in turn is based on The 17 Points from 
the Geneva Conference of 1955 (See Appendix B) , the document 
which the Soviets originally rejected. (Although it is 
beyond the present purposes of this thesis, it is 
interesting to note that, in 1983, during President Reagan's 
tenure, the NSC would issue a directive, NSDD-77, which 
described public diplomacy as "those actions of the U.S. 
Government designed to generate support for our national 
security objectives," thus tightening its jurisdiction over 
cultural and informational programs.)
Indeed, NSC 5607 contains part of the secret of East- 
West exchange success. According to the document, cultural 
exchanges provided an excellent vehicle for implementation 
of "positive" U.S. foreign policy. Policy Consideration #8, 
"East-West Exchanges," cited cultural exchange as an 
"offensive" foreign policy that could succeed in promoting a 
desire for greater individual freedom, well-being and 
security within the Soviet Union, and greater independence 
of the satellites, as contrasted to the "defensive" policy 
of containment by force. This policy, engineered by the 
executive, endowed public diplomacy with enough legitimacy
“Richmond, 6.
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to survive by officially linking its activities to national 
security, a cause that rallied enough Congressional funding 
to keep public diplomacy afloat.
Conclusion
NSC recommendations, executive approval, public
opinion, and favorable press coverage, all conspired to
hoist cultural exchange to a position of prominence during
the Cold War. Beginning in 1954, the U.S. press issued
calls to cultural arms. With seeming envy, Time reported,
"The Russians have launched one of their periodic offensives
of cultural chuminess with the West," a chuminess that
included exchanges with France, Canada & United Kingdom, but
not the U.S.24 Newsweek asked, "Now that Soviet culture
seems to be spreading, how about visits to the U.S.?"25 A
State Department publication applied pressure and humor to
coax reluctant parties into backing East-West exchange:
With over 1,000 delegations entering and leaving the 
Soviet Union in 1954, cultural exchange is assuming a 
major position in the Communist propaganda effort.
Coming after a period when cultural traffic across the 
Iron Curtain had been virtually at a stand still, the 
expansion of the last two years appears spectacular. It 
should be remembered, however, that the Soviet Union is 
still no land of tourism and that the total number of 
people allowed to enter the Soviet Union in the last 
year is fewer than the Duchy of Luxembourg would 
expect in a moderately good season.26
24"Muscovite Music Hall," Time 63, 10 May 1954, 72.
^"Moscow's New Tune," Newsweek 43, 10 May 1954, 90.
26,,Soviet Cultural Exchange -- A One-Way Street," Notes: 
Soviet Affairs, Number: 165, 24 January 1955, 1.
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By 1956, the White House released this press report:
THE WHITE HOUSE 
The President today approved the recommendation of the 
National Security Council that the United States should 
seek exchanges between the United States and the 
countries of Eastern Europe including the USSR along the 
lines of the seventeen point program put forward by the 
Western Foreign Ministers at Geneva in October 1955. 
Although this program was unacceptable to the Soviet 
Government at that time, the President believes that 
such a program, if carried out in good faith and with 
true reciprocity, may now contribute to the better 
understanding of the peoples of the world that 
must be the foundation of peace."27
27White House Press Release, James C. Hagerty, Press 
Secretary to the President, 29 June 1956, USIA Library, 1.
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Time Magazine 
February 10, 1958
"The Big Swap"
Ever since the summit conference at Geneva in 1955 
the U.S. and Russia have been trying to work out a 
cultural exchange agreement. Last week, after three 
months of negotiations, they signed one which, if 
carried out in good faith, might be an important 
"beginning of a beginning" (as Senate Majority Leader 
Lyndon Johnson put it). Under its terms the two 
nations undertake, during 1958 and 1959, to swap:
* Radio and television programs on science, industry, 
agriculture, education, public health, sports and 
carefully censured international political topics.
* Recordings of folk, classical and contemporary music
* Up to six of each other's writers, six composers, 
four painters or sculptors, plus delegations of 
student editors and professional women.
* An unspecified number of commercial films (current 
U.S. films have been scarce in Russia since 1948), 
plus twelve to 15 documentaries.
* Singers Roberta Peters and Blanche Thebom and 
Conductor Leopold Stokowski, the Philadelphia 
Orchestra for Soviet Pianist Emil Gilels and 
Violinist Leonid Kogan (who are in the U.S. now), 
plus the Bolshoi Ballet and other stellar attractions.
* Four delegations of college professors to study the 
other's educational system; up to 2 0 students from 
Moscow and Leningrad universities to attend U.S. 
universities for a year and vice versa.
As far as it went, the U.S.-Russia cultural exchange 
agreement went a good way. But measured against the 
idea--or even the U.S. Government's original minimum 
conditions--it left much to be desired. It failed to 
1) bind the Russians to stop jamming U.S. broadcasts 
into Russia, 2) give the U.S. some minimum uncensored 
access to Russia's controlled press and radio and tele­
vision to match the uncensored play Russia gets daily 
in the U.S., or 3) stop Russia from declaring much of 
its country off base to U.S. visitors; a ban that is 
reciprocated by the U.S. in regard to Russian visitors.
THE SWAP
As Time reported, the "Big Swap" began in 1958 with
lofty missions of international cooperation and freer flow
of information between warring blocs. The agreement, known
informally as The Lacy-Zaroubin Agreement after those who
signed it, began with an opening statement by W.S.B. Lacy,
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, in which he
heralded the beginning of an East-West cultural accord:
I welcome here today the Soviet delegation, headed by 
Ambassador Zaroubin, to discuss with us in a series of 
meetings, ways and means to develop and increase 
contacts in the technical, scientific, and cultural 
fields between the peoples of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
Those of us assembled here are not strangers to each 
other in this effort. It is my hope that by sitting 
down together in an informal way we may be able to reach 
some new understanding and common approach to the 
problems involved in exchange -- not only in exchanging 
scientists, technicians, entertainers, athletes and the 
like, but exchange of information and ideas, which in 
our opinion is not only the necessary ingredient to a 
better understanding between all peoples, but leads also 
to a lessening of tensions and to the development of 
international cooperation. Progress in the removal of 
barriers, currently obstructing the free flow of 
information and ideas, is an important objective of my 
Government in these talks.1
The 1958 agreement built on the aims of 1930s U.S. 
public diplomacy in its efforts to break through the 
cultural barriers of fear and hostility and to combat 
unwelcome propaganda. Most especially, by reaching a broad
lnOpening Statements of United States and U.S.S.R. 
Representatives on Technical, Scientific and Cultural 
Exchanges," Department of State Press Release No. 597, 
28 October 1957, 1.
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audience through the popular press in each country, the 
exchange programs were meant to promote U.S. goals by 
influencing Soviet public opinion. But the Latin American 
experiment, in which performing arts exchanges took a back 
seat to educational exchange, may have been an inadequate 
dress rehearsal for the U.S.-Soviet Cold War cultural circus 
in which performing arts exchanges took center stage.
The Big Swap was an exercise in extremes: anecdotes on 
hardships and failures are matched by tales of prodigious 
success. That U.S.-Soviet cultural exchange happened at all 
is remarkable; that it was a tough go is not surprising.
U.S. government-sponsored cultural exchanges performed in 
spite of risks to and impediments from both Soviet and 
American sources.
Accounts of Russian intransigence are legion. A 
certain epic forbearance saw American diplomats through 
Sisyphean struggles with Soviet cunning, tactics which 
included the jamming of radio broadcasts, the censoring of 
media programs, advance sniping in the press, and 
restrictions on travel within the USSR, all of which mostly 
afflicted informational exchange. These problems, as cited 
in the Time magazine article, never were conquered, 
rendering information exchange less effective than had been 
hoped.
Soviet tactics, far short of subtle, did not always 
have the intended effect, however. Almost three million
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Soviets, for instance, pushed through the gates of the
American National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, an annual
informational fair which featured all things American.
Advance sniping in the Soviet press, designed to destroy the
credibility of the American display, did little to keep the
Soviet public from clammering for information about America,
much to Soviet authorities' dismay.2 Yale Richmond has
said that the Soviets regretted taking the risk that the
informational exchanges posed because they were too popular
with the Soviet public:
The USIA exhibitions have had a phenomenal success 
in the Soviet Union, and the Soviet authorities 
probably wished they had never agreed to them, for 
they have attempted several times to delete them from 
the cultural agreement.3
Although they signed an official cultural exchange agreement
biannually, beginning in 1958, the Soviets attempted to keep
U.S. government involvement to a minimum, and struck deals
with both private and public American sectors, enjoying the
best of both worlds.4 For example, the Soviets cut deals
with the likes of impresario Sol Hurok whenever the U.S.
government terms were inconvenient for them. The U.S.
government required reciprocity and relaxation of travel
restrictions, terms which the Soviets were loathe to honor
and which private American agents could not demand.
2Barghoorn, 12.
3Richmond, 26.
4Ibid., 13.
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The Saturday Review reported:
Naturally, our officials say, the Soviets like to build 
up their profit potential by dealing privately with 
impresarios such as Mr. Sol Hurok, who manages the 
Soviet troupes in the U.S. Our U.S. officials protest 
when the Soviet Ministry of Culture claims it can book 
the New York City Ballet into only five Soviet cities 
for eight weeks this fall; meanwhile, Mr. Hurok is 
booking the Bolshoi Ballet into nine American cities for 
thirteen weeks.5
But the Soviets' shuffle around the official agreement 
and alliance with Sol Hurok, was partly encouraged by 
internal wrangling in the U.S. If the Soviets were 
intransigent, some key American contingents were 
uncooperative, so much so that public diplomacy was almost a 
casualty of the democratic process. The House of 
Representatives consistently allocated only minimal funds 
for public diplomacy, and a Senate majority, led by Senator 
Fulbright, supported government funding of public diplomacy, 
but opposed government regulation, and politicization, of 
cultural exchange. Factions within the State Department-- 
those for and against the use of cultural diplomacy for 
foreign policy objectives--continued to bicker over the role 
of public diplomacy. Consequently, many performing arts 
exchanges occurred outside of the official agreement due to 
both Soviet and American political shenanigans. As 
Frederick Barghoorn tells it:
It should be noted that less than half of the American
5Benton, William, "Should We Continue the Cultural 
Exchanges with the USSR?" Saturday Review, 27 October 1962, 
19-20.
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artists or art groups that performed in the Soviet Union 
after 1954 were financed directly or indirectly by the 
United States Government. The Ed Sullivan Show and 
Holiday on Ice, for example, were purely private 
ventures, from the financial point of view, although the 
negotiations for these and other ventures involved 
official Soviet-American dealings. Opinion is divided 
in competent American circles as to whether or not the 
role of government, on our side, should be greater than 
it usually has been, or whether a free enterprise system 
in cultural and entertainment fields is compatible with 
a decisive government role in policy for exchanges.6
In 1961, a new administration ordered a study of the 
cultural diplomacy program and suspended it for six months, 
just as American artists were staging a virtual cultural 
coup d'etat in the USSR. Concomitant to the Cuban blockade, 
the exchanges were temporarily derailed, Newsweek reported, 
due in part to "sharp criticism, especially in Congress, of 
both the purpose and administration of the Cultural 
Presentations program.1,7 Though a blow to public 
diplomacy, the hiatus would end in a decision to promote 
performing arts exchanges as the exchange of choice.
American diplomats submitted to the vagaries of Soviet 
cultural sleight-of-hand, mostly because they had only two 
choices, according to J.D. Parks; "to accept Moscow's 
methods and to maintain contacts in a restricted and limited 
manner, or to reject both the method and the contacts."8 
In 1958, the U.S. chose the former because it came to view
6Barghoorn, 317.
7"Exchange Examined," Newsweek, 14 January 1963, 64.
8Parks, 5.
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cultural relations, the so-called "cultural offensive," as a 
means to foreign policy and national security ends. This 
commitment pitted democratic American public diplomacy 
against totalitarian Soviet propaganda. The Soviets were 
characteristically keen and shrewd competitors, as Assistant 
Secretary of State William Benton reported in 1962: "Most 
Westerners in Moscow say the Soviet Ministry of Cultural 
Relations is the most slippery and unreliable of all the 
Soviet Ministries with which to deal.”9 And as Richmond 
contends, "Cultural exchange was seen as another aspect of 
competition by the Soviets in which the stronger 
triumphs. "10
A Drama of Peace and Truth 
Informational and cultural exchange, standard bearers 
of goodwill between the two nations, were not free of 
periodic transcontinental dramas. Two rivals, Peace and 
Truth, went head to head in the cultural show. While both 
sides talked of peace and cooperation, the Soviets, early 
on, appropriated the peace theme and its traditional symbol, 
the dove, which they paraded in every available venue. 
William and Mary professor Alan Ward recalls that a 1950s 
London concert of the Red Army Chorus was advertised with 
posters that featured a dove of peace. The Soviets,
9Benton, 20.
10Richmond, 18.
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Barghoorn adds, were particularly skilled at projecting the
image of themselves as peacemakers:
Soviet exploitation of cultural contacts has usually 
revolved around the strategy and propaganda of peaceful 
coexistence. Soviet leaders have always insisted that 
their professed enthusiasm for international contacts 
was proof of their devotion to peace. This is an 
appealing thesis, for most people do tend to associate 
friendly personal contacts with hopeful prospects for 
peace.11
In response, the United States continued its truth theme, 
begun with Truman's "Campaign of Truth" in 1950. The USIA 
motto, "Truth is our greatest weapon," informed all 
informational exchange. The U.S. informational enterprise-- 
"to depict U.S. society as truthfully as possible, warts and 
all"--was to be "honest to be credible."12 "Little by 
little," President Eisenhower predicted, "mistrust based on 
falsehoods will give,way to international understanding 
based on truth."13
While the U.S. trafficked in truth, the Soviets
misappropriated the language of peace, an exercise in
equivocation that included a stockpile of doublespeak which
distorted the basic terms on which U.S.-Soviet cultural
agreements were founded. As Frederick Barghoorn, one-time
Press Attache and Ambassador to Moscow, tells it:
We must remember, of course, that Soviet communists, 
like all communists, use words in unusual ways. It is
^Ibid., 15.
12Personal Interview with Hans Tuch, March 1993.
12The New York Times, 24 August 1956.
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well known, for example, that the word 'peace' in Soviet 
usage means, as Lindley Fraser observes, 'the state of 
affairs inside a communist country.' And yet it is a 
major objective of Soviet policy to persuade non- 
communists that, when communists use the word peace, 
they give it the same meaning as do non-communists.
A somewhat similar situation prevails with respect to 
Soviet usage of such terms as 'cultural relations' or 
'cultural exchange.' While professing reciprocity, the 
Kremlin practices, in so far as possible, a unilateral 
dissemination of Soviet influence; only too often, in 
the vital field of exchange of scientific and technical 
knowledge with non-communist countries, Moscow seeks to 
obtain patents, blue-prints, and processes and, in 
return, to offer flattery, vague promises, and, it must 
be admitted, an impressively cordial and often charming 
hospitality. The term 'exchange' itself thus takes its 
place in the communist arsenal of double-talk.14
Even while the 1958 cultural agreement committed the 
two nations to a single common cause, each spoke a different 
language, setting conditions for miscommunication and 
mishap. Thus, in the name of peaceful coexistence, and 
under auspices defined by equivocation, the Soviets seized 
the moment to demonstrate Soviet devotion to peace, while 
the U.S. government used truthspeak to promote East-West 
intercourse.
An Uneven Match
The cultural competition, according to Barghoorn, 
pitted a "monolithic, hierarchical Soviet state with 
enforced homogeneity of ideas" against a "loosely organized, 
almost chaotic pattern of American democracy." Soviet 
cultural diplomacy, which constituted an integral part of
14Barghoorn, 13 .
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Soviet totalitarian political ideology, dwarfed its American 
equivalent. Soviet citizens were expected to be mouthpieces 
of official policy. All Soviet literature, dance, music, 
and art played a part in the political struggle, and the 
Communist party developed a rich tradition of cultural 
stagecraft dating at least to the 1925 creation of the state 
cultural organ, VOKS. As Barghoorn notes, "Central to 
communist cultural diplomacy is the systematic utilization 
of information, artistic, scientific, and other cultural 
materials, symbols and personnel, and ideas, as instruments 
of foreign policy."15
The Soviets circulated propaganda pamphlets in a 
campaign to promote Soviet culture over Western bourgeois 
culture. The 1954 pamphlet, On Soviet Culture and the 
Cultural Revolution in the USSR, for example, a widely 
dispersed apocalyptic vision and cultural concomitant to 
Khruschev's "We will bury you" boast, proclaimed the 
following: "Our country is the country of the most advanced
culture, the citadel of advanced scientific thought, of 
revolutionary humanism and of a new, Communist morality."16
U.S. diplomats faced the Soviet effort which included 
both an "effort to project to all men an image of the Soviet 
way of life" and a "calculated effort to facilitate Soviet 
foreign policy objectives." Moreover, despite its pretense
15Ibid., 11, 12, 13, 272.
16Ibid., 19.
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to benevolence/ Soviet propaganda projected a dual thrust, 
both a "complex amalgam of propaganda, deception and 
sometimes mutually profitable transactions," and an "equally 
massive effort to shield the Kremlin's subjects from harmful 
'alien' influences."17 Up against such Soviet messionic 
zeal, American public diplomacy could not be allowed to die 
on the vine. Of necessity, it was repackaged into a loose 
cultural equivalent to State Department Director of Policy 
Planning George Kennan's thesis of containment. Just as 
Kezrnan advised "to confront the Russians with unalterable 
counter-force at every point where they show signs of 
encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable 
world, 1,18 so the U.S. informational offensive was 
conscripted to meet Soviet propaganda wherever is surfaced-- 
no small undertaking.
Like Tactics, Unlike Ends
As the exchanges proceeded, each side sought to 
maximize gains in its primary objectives. The Soviets aimed 
to soften up the West in order to gain access to U.S. 
science and technology, to earn dollars, and promote a 
favorable image of themselves. The United States aimed to 
penetrate and revolutionize Soviet society by promoting a 
freer flow of people, ideas and information, a goal
17Ibid., 12.
18,lThe Sources of Soviet Conduct," by "X", Foreign 
Affairs, 1947, 581.
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initially envisioned by Secretary Dulles. Although goals
were quite different, tactics of each bloc were similar, a
sampling of which includes the following:
Mechanisms to control exchanges under the agreement were 
established early by both governments, the State 
Committee for Cultural Relations in the USSR, and the 
East-West Contacts Staff in the U.S. Department of 
State.
The State Committee took a confrontational attitude on 
most exchanges, reflecting not only the Cold War 
attitude of the times but also the career affiliation of 
many of its officers--the KGB. The Americans 
reciprocated. It was strictly tit-for-tat.
Each proposal for an exchange was presented to the other 
government in the form of a diplomatic aide memoire.
This was very useful in avoiding misunderstandings-- 
always possible in Soviet-American relations--but it 
considerably slowed the process of getting on with 
exchanges.
Security and intelligence were major considerations for 
both sides. Travel and access for exchange visitors 
were tightly controlled in each country. Exchange 
visitors were under surveillance in both countries. 
Americans in the Soviet Union were often harassed and 
occasionally entrapped by the KGB. A pattern of 
harassment and expulsion did not end until the early 
1970s.19
In truth, neither bloc was blameless in the tit-for- 
tat, tug-of-war that passed for public diplomacy in the Cold 
War. 1958 was just the beginning of what would be both a 
cultural accord and a contest of civilizations. "Since that 
time," Parks notes, "the two nations have signed similar 
pacts every two years, providing at least one relatively 
stable element in an uneasy relationship that on occasion
19Richmond, 9-10.
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has become volatile."20 But, in the main, the pact was 
more contretemps than rendezvous. Each side was guarded and 
confrontational, due to security and intelligence 
considerations, and progress was gradual, painful, and 
episodic, according to Irene Carstones, Cultural Affairs 
Officer, USIA.21
East-West Tuq-of-War
As Yale Richmond explains, the benefits of
informational exchange to the U. S. were compromised by
relentless Soviet control. In his book, U.S.-Soviet
Cultural Relations, which Irene Carstones has hailed as the
singular and superb treatment of the East-West Exchanges,
Richmond dedicates several chapters to sharing anecdotes of
Soviet tactics and problems in all forms of exchange.
Informational exchanges had more problems than anticipated.
The Soviets insisted on retaining full control over what was
reported in their own media, frustrating the primary U.S.
goal of infusing ideas into the Soviet Union:
Information exchanges--motion pictures, radio and 
and television, and books and publications--are the 
most ideological exchanges for the Soviet Union 
because they threaten its monopoly on information.
These exchanges, therefore, proved to be the most 
difficult for the United States to carry out under the 
cultural agreement.22
20Parks, 173.
21Interview with Irene Carstones, USIA, March 1993.
22Richmond, 63.
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Problems with reciprocity, jamming of radio broadcasts,
censorship of the media, and travel restrictions, plagued
the informational and educational exchanges much more than
their performing arts complements. Records of diplomatic
meetings confirm this claim. Statements given at the time
of the U.S.-USSR Cultural Agreement in 1958 by W.S.B. Lacy,
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, cited
grievances that continually hindered the success of the
information exchange program. Not only was the U.S.
government powerless over Soviet controls, it was also
unable to control the US private sector:
In the field of exchanges of information, we immediately 
encounter basic obstacles. There is an all-embracing 
Soviet censorship of press and radio. There is 
systematic jamming of radio broadcasts from other 
countries.... It is regrettable that, once in the Soviet 
Union, the places a tourist may go are limited to 
specified areas....The arrangements for distribution 
[of Amerika] has been less than satisfactory. . . .
Where it is a question of the exchanges of technical 
delegations, entertainment groups, and the like, you 
already realize that on our side it must concern private 
industry, individual impresarios, our private 
institutions and organizations. The Department of State 
cannot speak for them, and, believe it or not, cannot 
induce them to do that which they do not wish to do. I 
cannot emphasize this point too much.23
The U.S. government continued to operate according to 
parameters set in the Latin American prototype--reciprocity, 
private-public cooperation and a modest scale--even though
23"Opening Statements by United States and U.S.S.R. 
Representatives on Technical, Scientific, and Cultural 
Exchanges," Department of State Bulletin, 28 October 
1957, 2.
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the U.S. endeavor was subsequently handicapped. The modest
scale of U.S. public diplomacy, vis-a-vis its Soviet
complement, reduced the U.S. effort to an exercise in
futility, some members of Congress argued. Frederick
Barghoorn reported:
A superficial comparison of the massive, streamlined, 
centralized Soviet foreign cultural program with the 
sometimes fumbling official American response to its 
challenge, [suggests] that we are doomed to defeat in 
the current contest of civilizations.24
But some government involvement was necessary for 
monitoring persistent problems--reciprocity, equality and 
mutuality of benefits in exchanges. The U.S. private 
sector, so long in control of U.S. cultural diplomacy, could 
not have mastered the Cold War contest of civilizations 
without the diplomatic and regulatory expertise of the U.S. 
government. Private and commercial enterprises, many of 
whom had resented U.S. government involvement, were not 
equipped to negotiate with the implacable Soviets. Due to 
an extreme disparity in public diplomacy budgets and the 
systems used to enact it, the Soviets had the edge. In 
1959, for example, the estimated Soviet public diplomacy 
budget was a whopping $1,167,000,00025 while the total 
American budget weighed in at an anorexic $75,000,000.26
24Barghoorn, 8 - 9 .
25Ibid. , 158.
26Interview with Theodore Streibert, "The New 'Voice of 
A m e r i c a U . S .  News & World Report, 26 March 1954, 64.
89
Some twenty-five years later# the tale would remain the 
same: $3.5 billion Soviet budget27 to $100.0 million 
American investment.28
Academic exchange was underfinanced on the U.S. side,
both privately and publicly. Professor and exchange
organizer Robert Byrnes noted that total private and public
U.S. appropriations to this vital enterprise were small by
Soviet standards:
During the period between 1958 and 1975 our government, 
foundations, and universities together spent less than 
$50,000,000 to support academic exchange programs with 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, only a fraction of 
the annual budget of a major state university in the 
1970s or the cost of the Apollo-Soiuz joint manned space 
laboratory in July 1975.29
The Soviets, eager to fulfill their foreign policy goal 
of gaining access to Western science and technology, 
invested heavily in exchanges, sending professionals on 
student exchanges. Hundreds of so-called students came from 
the USSR to the U.S. inside and outside of the agreement, 
violating reciprocity, a chief tenet of U.S. cultural 
exchanges. The academic exchanges were much more difficult 
to monitor than the highly visible performing arts 
exchanges, and the U.S. government was limited in its 
ability to correct violations that were difficult to prove:
27Starr, x.
28Budget of the United States, 1985.
29Byrnes, 231.
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The principal American leverage for assuring reciprocity 
is the visa authority, which assures complete control 
over the flow of Soviet visitors. Beyond this power, 
however, the U.S. has found that the limitation of 
information about Soviet society makes it difficult to 
pinpoint what we consider to be desirable exchanges.30
Visa control notwithstanding, it was next to impossible
to prove clear violations, such as the Soviet tactic of
repeatedly sending professional scientists on graduate
student exchanges. The U.S. government finally threw its
hands up, and granted approval to exchanges not covered in
the official agreement. According to Yale Richmond:
Cultural exchanges were released from the strictures of 
the intergovernmental agreement with its quotas and 
limits. The private sector was invited by State to
participate in what previously had been a government-
directed and regulated activity, and the result was a 
broadening of U.S. contracts with the Soviet Union.31
Travel restrictions continually plagued people-to- 
people exchanges. The Soviets designated portions of their 
country as out of bounds to travellers and exchangees, and 
the U.S. government responded by closing off portions of the 
U.S. Nonetheless, the U.S. government made repeated 
overtures to the USSR to lift the geographical restrictions, 
offering a menu that included strict reciprocity-- 
Novosibirsk for Los Angeles, Omsk for Seattle, Tomsk for 
Louisville, and so on. The Soviets ignored the appeals.
Due to travel restrictions, visits to the USSR were
30,1 Soviet American Exchanges: For Different Reasons, Both 
Sides Find Them Advantageous," Science, 10 November 1961,
1511.
31Richmond, 13 .
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unpleasant for official representatives and tourists alike.
The State Department addressed the problem, with limited
success. The Nation reported:
The United States has recently taken a sensible step 
toward increasing this intercourse [in U.S.-Soviet 
relations] . At present, a third of the USSR is closed to 
foreign eyes, and in America we have closed an 
equivalent area to Russians. Almost a year ago, the 
State Department suggested that both countries remove 
these restrictions. The Russians have not replied and 
now, with a patience too rare in American diplomacy, we 
have submitted a second proposal, urging that at least 
some equivalent areas be opened.32
Information exchange was less effective also due to the
disparity between the Soviet and American public diplomacy
systems. The mixed private-public American system afforded
the Soviets a unique opportunity. Cueing into the American
debate over control of cultural exchanges, the Soviets
stirred up dissension among American groups by playing one
sector off another. Much like the Sol Hurok alliance, the
Soviets circumvented the official agreements and instead
negotiated directly with the private U.S. media. Yale
Richmond notes:
Moscow, after a few years of attempting to place its 
[radio/TV] programs through U.S. government channels, 
began to deal directly with the U.S. networks and indivi­
dual stations. By 1965 the placement of the programs 
under the agreement was down to zero, and the exchange 
of broadcasts was deleted from the agreement in 1968.33
It was easier for the Soviets to suspend fair play in
32,,The Diplomacy of Friendship," The Nation, 7 June 1958,
52.
33Richmond, 66.
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information exchanges than in the high profile performing
arts exchanges. Moreover, the Soviets exercised tighter
control over informational than cultural exchanges.
Business Week reported, "The biggest roadblocks set up by
the Kremlin have been in the area of exchange of ideas--
publications, films, broadcasts--rather than in an exchange
of people."34 Unhappily, therefore, informational exchange
encountered unforeseen difficulties. For example, what was
designed to be an even exchange of Soviet and American
official publications met unexpected roadblocks because
Soviet and American publics had unequal interest in the
publications. The Soviets blocked access to the American
magazine, Amerika, while Americans, given free access to the
Soviet magazine, USSR, showed little interest. A 1962
Science magazine reported the troubles that beset the
exchange of Amerika and USSR, an endeavor that had been
intended to engender cordial relations:
One of the principal means for circulating information 
about this country was to be the monthly magazine 
Amerika, a slick picture publication, something in the 
format of Life, which was to be permitted a distribution 
of 50,000 in the Soviet Union in return for the same 
circulation here of a similar Soviet publication, USSR. 
Both are sold through newsstands and subscription, and 
the observation of American officials has been that 
Amerika is immensely sought after by the Soviet people.
In this country, however, slick magazine articles on the 
Soviet Union are not a novelty. USSR has encountered 
sales difficulties, and each month there has been a 
remainder of several thousand unsold copies. In
34"Will the Swaps Keep On?" Business Week, 23 November 
1963, 36.
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retaliation for the return of the unsold copies, the 
Soviets have taken to sending back several thousand 
copies of Amerika as unsalable.35
When information programs were not censored or blocked,
they were well-received by the Soviet people. The Voice of
America, when heard, was appreciated, as this anecdote told
by Barghoorn relates:
We found that the English-language broadcasts of the VOA 
and the BBC are immensely popular and we even learned 
that the head of the English Department of the 
University of Moscow had recently told a foreign 
ambassador that Soviet students were learning the 
American pronunciation of English by listening to the 
VOA.36
Nonetheless, the penetration of U.S. broadcasts into 
the USSR was uneven, whereas performing arts exchanges were 
more tamper-proof. Jamming, for example, rendered the VOA 
only marginally effective: "Soviet jamming of the Voice of 
America ended partially in 1959 and completely in 1963, was 
resumed in 1968, ended again in 1973, and was resumed again 
in 1980.37
Conclusion
Initially, information exchanges, including electronic 
and print mediums, exhibitions and libraries, and some 
academic exchanges, were the chief U.S. instruments of hope 
for penetrating the USSR. Many proved to be both
25Science, 10 November 1961, 1512.
36Barghoorn, 154.
37Richmond, 99.
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disappointing and frustrating, however, by the following 
measure: "Assessing the results of cultural exchange with 
the Soviet Union is not easy," Yale Richmond advises, "but 
what can be measured are changes made by Soviet Union to 
accommodate exchanges with the West." Three key problems-- 
reciprocity, travel restrictions, and free flow of 
information--continually frustrated the U.S. initiative, 
largely due to lack of Soviet accommodation. Of the 
seventeen points in the 1955 Geneva Conference agreement, 
the defining accord for all subsequent East-West cultural 
exchange agreements, four key conditions were not 
implemented:
1. Freer exchange of information and ideas, including an 
end to censorship;
2. Opening of information centers in each other's capitals;
3. End of jamming of radio broadcasts;
4. End of travel restrictions on diplomats.38
Because these four points were not implemented, 
informational exchanges were not as successful as the 
administration had hoped. In time, performing arts exchange 
upstaged information exchange, because the former was more 
effective in staging a cultural offensive. A 1964 
Department of State Press Release promoted the idea that 
Cultural Presentations should be made an increasingly 
important arm of U.S. foreign policy.39 The definitive
38Ibid., 97.
39,,Cultural Presentations Program of Department of State 
Seen Making Substantial Progress," Department of State Press 
Release No. 531, 2 9 December 1964.
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1962 report on cultural exchange explained the shift in
emphasis from informational to cultural programs:
Very early in the program it became evident that the 
original concept of using fairs and festivals as the 
foci of the program was unrealistic and impractical.
With few exceptions, they did not provide ideal settings 
for demonstrations of culture, and offerings were 
considered not so much manifestations of American 
cultural development as they were thought of as entries 
in a cultural sweepstakes competition.
In a shift away from festivals, emphasis quickly moved 
toward bringing some of our most notable performing arts 
to audiences in the great capitals of the world.40
Performing arts exchanges offered hope for salvaging
goodwill among nations, and were heralded, with much ado, as
a possible saving grace of U.S.-Soviet relations. The
Saturday Evening Post reported:
Why, then, all the fuss over the possibility that 
Americans and Russians may, in a cautious and 
restrained manner, make arrangements to exchange TV 
shows, ballet dancers, scientific operations and works 
of literature? It isn't so long ago that the works of 
Tolstoy and Maxim Gorky were imported and read by 
Americans. Why the need for so much protocol just to 
restore a fraction of that relationship? The answer, 
of course, is simply that the Communist dictatorship 
has deliberately cut the Russian people off from 
contacts with the outside world...41
Hope for reaching the Russian people came in the form of
performing arts exchanges, an unorthodox vehicle for U.S.
foreign policy.
40Larsen, 12.
41,,Why All the Uproar and Protocol, Just to Trade Cultures 
with Khrushchev?" Saturday Evening Post, 1 March 1958, 10.
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Business Week 
23 November 1963
"Will the Swaps Keep On?
Barghoorn Incident jeopardizes the Renewal of 
Cultural Exchange Pact"
"The sound of laughter in New York is the 
same as in Moscow," says Zinovy Gerdt, master of 
ceremonies of the Obratsov Puppet theater. Gerdt 
has been playing to packed houses at Manhattan's 
Broadway Theater for the past month under the 
banner of a broad cultural exchange program 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
Last week, though, Americans stopped laughing. 
The arrest of Yale Prof. Frederick C. Barghoorn 
on espionage charges in Moscow put a new chill 
on American-Soviet relations. The atmosphere 
warmed slightly at midweek following Barghoorn's 
release, which came after President Kennedy 
threatened to cancel negotiations for renewal 
of the five-year-old cultural exchange program.
The secretive life. The biggest roadblocks set 
up by the Kremlin have been in the area of 
exchange of ideas--publications, films, broadcasts 
--rather than in an exchange of people. This 
reflects the tight thought control characteristic 
of Soviet life.
Realistic view. The Administration has no 
illusions that cultural exchanges will resolve 
the cold war. Officials feel the program is too 
limited in scope and the power of the Communist 
oligarchy too great to effect any substantial 
change in Soviet policy in the foreseeable future.
Two-Way Street. In the long run, though, 
Washington hopes the program will stimulate in 
Russia desires for political and intellectual 
freedom and a higher standard of living--and 
thus weaken the power of the state and its 
ability to concentrate on the East-West struggle.
In the area of the arts, visits by such 
performers as the New York City Ballet, the 
Robert Shaw Chorale, the Benny Goodman band, 
and the Boston Symphony have ripped away much 
of what one scholar terms Russia's "xenophobic 
curtain." American groups and individual 
artists have been greeted with unalloyed 
enthusiasm by Soviet audiences.
At the height of the U-2 incident, when soprano 
Roberta Peters had to catch a late train to 
Moscow after appearing in Leningrad, hundreds 
of cheering concert-goers escorted her to the 
station.
Selling the States. At the same time, tours 
of America by groups like the Bolshoi Ballet, 
the Moscow Circus, and the Leningrad Symphony 
have given many Americans glimpses of real 
live Russians and some understanding of 
their ideas.
Artists and entertainers generally are less 
politically oriented than other Soviet citizens 
and seem to have wider latitude in expressing 
opinions. .Many react enthusiastically to 
America and don't hesitate to say so when they 
return home. A few years ago, Igor Moiseyev, 
head of the famous dance troupe, went so far 
as to praise U.S. culture in a Moscow lecture.
One observer comments that the Russians are 
tremendously impressed by American life and 
shocked by the disparity between the official 
Communist portrayal and what they see for 
themselves. Unanimously, the young Russians 
acclaim the cultural exchange program as a 
way of reducing tensions and furthering peace.
Matter of value. Whatever the motive, the 
speed with which the Communists freed Barghoorn 
after Kennedy's protest indicates that they 
value the program too much to jeopardize 
its continuance--at least for the present.
THE COUP 
Part I
Performing Arts Exchange,
Where Soviet and American Interest Dovetailed
As the 1963 Business Week article suggests, performing 
arts exchanges became an arena in which Soviet and American 
interests dovetailed, for a number of reasons: they were 
less threatening than information exchange to the Soviets' 
desire for control but they nonetheless permitted the United 
States to penetrate the Soviet's "xenophobic curtain." They 
gave Americans "glimpses of real live Russians." Soviet 
artists and entertainers, less politically oriented than 
academics and journalists, were given wider latitude to 
express opinions that might otherwise have been censored, 
some of which were uncharacteristically complimentary to our 
"bourgeois and decadent society." And many in each bloc saw 
the exchanges as a means for reducing tensions.
Irene Carstones, Cultural Officer, USIA, who, for some 
thirty years negotiated arts exchanges with the Soviets, 
explained that performing arts exchanges just happened to 
function as the meeting ground where "Soviet and American 
interests dovetailed." Performing arts exchanges addressed 
U.S. interests, which were generally "subtle and 
educational," Carstones notes, and Soviet interests, which 
were "commercial and financial."1 Strategies dovetailed,
1Interview with Irene Carstones, March 1993.
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too, according to journalist Stephen S. Rosenfeld, who 
conjectured that America's strategy of "taming of the 
shrewd" was paired with the Soviets' strategy of "skewering 
of the tame.'"2
"Countries conduct cultural exchange to show off their 
achievements and to generate good will," Yale Richmond says. 
"For the United States, however, cultural exchanges with the 
Soviet Union have also been used to break down barriers to a 
freer exchange of people, ideas, and information.1,3 
American diplomats, ever pragmatists, did not overlook the 
practical benefit of utilizing these gentle persuaders as 
agents of change. Conveniently, entry into the Soviet bloc 
was made possible in part by the generous support of 
Yekaterina A. Furtseva, Minister of Culture from 1960-1974, 
a consistently strong advocate of Soviet cultural activities 
abroad--with good reason.4 According to a 1964 Department 
of State Bulletin, cultural exchanges allowed the Soviets to 
advance two primary goals: obtaining scientific and 
technical information (through educational exchanges); and 
painting a favorable picture of the Soviet Union and its 
policies (via exchange of artistic groups, motion pictures, 
magazines, or visitors). Performing arts exchanges helped
2Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Soviet-American Exchanges--Tit- 
for-Tat Goodwill," Science 143, 27 March 1964, 1413.
3Richmond, 20.
4Ibid., 28.
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the Soviets achieve a third goal, earning much-needed
American dollars. U.S. officials understood the Soviets'
motivations, a 1962 Saturday Review article reported:
Our experienced U.S. government officials see clearly 
that the Soviets know exactly what they want out of 
exchanges: the latest scientific and technical infor­
mation, and the chance to send scientists, technicians 
and graduate students to the U.S. to get it; and the 
opportunity to make a favorable impression on the 
American people. These two initiatives are what 
Professor Frederick Barghoorn of Yale calls 'the Soviet 
cultural offensive.' Finally, the exchanges offer 
another advantage: the opportunity to earn money! For 
example, our U.S. officials estimate the Soviet 
government grossed the ruble equivalent of $500,000 out 
of the Benny Goodman tour of the USSR.5
U.S. officials accepted these terms, the 1964 Department of
State Bulletin reported, because the exchanges provided "a
beacon of hope" for promoting a long-term American goal--
accommodation of the normal flow of information and persons
between the two countries.6 In his 1961 report, Walter
Laves echoed the theme of hope:
Educational, scientific, and cultural contacts, 
constitute at present the most hopeful means through 
which we can make progress, however slow, toward 
piercing the 1 Iron Curtain" and toward the ultimate 
participation by the Communist countries in world 
affairs in a cooperating rather than in a disrupting 
role.7
5Benton, Saturday Review, 27 October 1962, 20.
6"A Summary Report on the United States Exchanges Program 
with the Soviet Union," Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges 
Staff, Department of State Report, 18 April 1964, 3-4.
7Walter H.C. Laves, "Toward a National Effort in 
International Educational and Cultural Affairs," at the 
request of The U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational 
Exchange, 3 April 1961, 16.
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In the main, the exchange program was something of a 
coup for each bloc, an agreement in which each power 
behefitted by cooperating through competition. "There is a 
'cultural cold war' between the United States and the Soviet 
Union," former Assistant Secretary of State William Benton 
stated in 1962, "and I suggest that each side is winning."8 
In the midst of the initial 1958 U.S.-Soviet Summit and 
kickoff of the cultural exchange, the popular press 
telegraphed a like message to the American people: "The
stakes in international diplomacy were clearly higher than 
in cultural exchanges. In diplomacy and military affairs 
there can be losers. In the field of art everyone 
gained.1,9
Because they accommodated the interests of each, the 
performing arts exchanges were a foreign policy bonanza for 
each power. While Carstones cautions that performing arts 
exchanges were considered to be of limited importance, they 
did "open a door between the two countries, help 
considerably to establish trust, and assist both countries 
in learning how to work with one another."10 Limited in 
scope and number, cultural exchanges nonetheless constituted 
"the busiest of all streets between Washington and Moscow,"
8Ibid.,40.
9,,Americans there. Russians there: Biz Terrif," Life 44,
28 April 1958, 28.
10Ibid.
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and were significant to each bloc, reported Science magazine 
in 1964:
The limited numbers and erratic dispersion of the 
exchanges are misleading. They play a role more and not 
less real for being largely symbolic, more and not less 
telling for being small. This is evident to both 
governments, which recently extended exchanges for two 
more years.11
Perhaps, as a 1958 Life magazine article suggested, cultural 
exchanges were the warm-up act, mere "people-to-people 
preliminaries" that paved the way for the East-West 
diplomatic initiative.12 But, what more could U.S. policy 
makers require in a handmaiden of foreign policy?
Why Performing Arts?
There was method in the madness of using performing 
artists who, through a "long-term, indirect process," acted 
as agents of change for the purpose of influencing Soviet 
society.13 Through cultural diplomacy, the U.S. gained 
access to Soviet soil, with the potential of infusing ideas 
into the USSR. Artists, due to the universality of their 
disciplines, provided a useful medium for promoting "Public 
Understanding," a 1964 Department of State press release 
reported:
11Rosenfeld, 1413.
12"Ambassadors Trying To Get Summit Show Also On The 
Road," Life 44, 2 8 April 1958, 36.
13"A Summary Report of the United States Exchanges Program 
with the Soviet Union," Department of State Report, 18 April 
1964, 4-5.
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The [US-Soviet cultural exchange} program is primarily 
intended to encourage international communication and 
understanding, and the performer is uniquely equipped to 
demonstrate American cultural achievements and to 
surmount political, geographic, and language barriers, 
because of the universality of the arts among peoples of 
the- world.14
Because of the universality of their medium, cultural
exchanges captured the imaginations of Soviet and American
publics alike, and kept a channel of communication open
between warring blocs. Indiana University Professor Byrnes,
a key organizer of U.S.-Soviet academic exchanges, describes
why performing arts (and sports) exchanges, which dominated
the public image of cultural exchanges, were public
diplomacy successes for each bloc:
For most Americans, and probably for most Soviet 
citizens as well, basketball players and ballet dancers, 
sprinters and soloists are the most important elements. 
Thus, the Bolshoi Ballet had made four tours to the 
United States by 197 0, as had the Moiseyev Folk Dance 
Ensemble. The Kirov Ballet has completed two tours of 
the United States. Such splendid groups not only serve 
a Soviet political purpose, entertaining and impressing 
thousands, but also earn dollars. For example, on its 
first trip to this country, the Moiseyev Folk Dance 
Ensemble grossed, $1,500,000 in an eleven-week tour. On 
the other hand, American groups perform in many cities 
in the Soviet Union, providing thousands of Soviet 
citizens some understanding and insight into the 
vitality and variety of our cultural life. Perhaps the 
most successful have been Benny Goodman, who gave 
thirty-one concerts in a tour in 1962, and Duke 
Ellington and his orchestra, who visited five Soviet 
cities in 1971 and attracted immense and enthusiastic 
audiences.15
14 "Cultural Presentations Programs of Department of State seen Making 
Substantial Progress in Advisory Committee Report," Department o f State For The Press, 
29 December 1964, No. 531, 2.
15Bymes, 50.
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Cultural exchanges, able to influence public opinion
through non-threatening means, offered a unique kind of
foreign policy strength. A 1958 Department of State
publication named cultural exchange as a potentially
powerful foreign policy instrument with "strength available
greater than that of armies, ,|16 because of its unique power
to persuade without threatening. Eisenhower and Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles echoed a similar sentiment.
Each believed that a defensive posture alone could never win
the Cold War and that cultural diplomacy could offer a
uniquely non-military source of foreign policy strength.
Dulles stated:
Security cannot be achieved by arms alone, no matter
how large their accumulation. So today it is vitally
important that we detect and pursue the ways in which 
cultural and economic assistance will mean more to free 
world strength, stability, and solidarity than will 
purely military measures.17
Part II
The Risks and Benefits of 
Performing Arts Exchange for Each Bloc
By signing the official cultural exchange agreement,
each bloc assumed risks in the name of foreign policy goals.
Moreover, the cultural agreement, beginning in 1958,
constituted a pact in which gambles, concessions, and risks
16Colligan, Francis J., "Twenty Year After: Two Decades 
of Government-Sponsored Cultural Relations," Department of 
State Bulletin, 21 July 1958, 20.
xlDepartment of State Bulletin, 22 April 1957, 635.
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were taken for mutual benefit. Each bloc believed it was 
the chief beneficiary of the exchanges, a mutual perception 
that rendered the performing arts exchanges even more 
attractive. "'We think we are getting the best of the 
deal,' one high-ranking American official told [Saturday 
Review3 , and they [the Soviets] think they are. This is the 
best of all possible deals."18
Nonetheless, the U.S. government took a risk by giving
the Soviet communist system an officially sanctioned vehicle
for engaging in propaganda and deception. Moreover,
performing arts exchanges granted the Soviets permission to
exercise and refine their considerable propaganda talents.
The USSR, through skillful manipulation of its artists,
showcased its achievements and projected its culture as
benign and magnificent. Frederick Barghoorn explains:
Soviet artists and scientists have made an excellent 
impression in foreign countries since the death of 
Stalin. They make even less effort to conduct overt 
propaganda than do Soviet journalists or officials. 
Soviet artists and scientists, like Soviet chess players 
and athletes, do not have to engage in propaganda. The 
excellence of their performances is the best advertise­
ment of Soviet culture.19
Soviet artists fostered the deception that the Bolsheviks
were proponents of peace and encouraged the notion that the
Soviet nation was as great as the art it produced. While
Soviet artists were relatively propaganda-free agents, the
18Kalb, Marvin L., "The Fine Art of Exchangemanship,"
Saturday Review 44, 13 May 1961, 56.
19Barghoorn, 145.
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exchanges provided an arena for the Soviets to reap
political capital. As Yale Richmond tells it:
Soviet artists project an image of a vital, talented and 
creative people whose government supports the arts and 
is dedicated to peace and friendship with all countries. 
If you like the Bolshoi, this line of thought goes, you 
might also like the Bolsheviks.20
Unlike the American system, all Soviet art represented
the state and upheld the party line. Also unlike the U.S.,
there was no known internal Soviet debate over linking
propaganda--such as the Soviets' self-promotion as the doves
of peace--to performing arts programs. Barghoorn believes
that the Soviets deliberately, and deceptively, engaged its
arts and artists to project a false image:
Soviet cultural diplomacy is often tinged by what non­
communists, at least, can only describe as deception.
In large part, its task is to establish in the minds 
of its targets associations between, for example, 
classical Russian music and the Kremlin's alleged 
desire for peace.21
Ever swift to seize a propaganda opportunity, reap benefit
from unlikely sources, and assert national prowess, Soviet
authorities turned cultural exchange on its head.
Khrushchev, for example, insisted that cultural exchanges
with the West were proof of the Soviet Union's prominence in
world affairs:
Khrushchev, in a speech to coal miners in 1956, revealed 
one of the subjective, psychological motives for display 
of Soviet culture abroad. He said: 'The country's 
growing authority abroad is reflected in the flood of
20Richmond, 17 .
21Barghoorn, 154.
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foreign delegations coining here.'22
But there were cracks in the Soviet propaganda machine,
and some risks did not pay off well. Soviet artists did not
always adhere to the party line, and defections, though
infrequent, were high profile news in the U.S. popular
press. Igor Moiseyev, for example, Soviet leader of a folk
dance group which Life called "Russia's most inviting Iron
Curtain-raiser," upset the Soviet cultural applecart when he
sang the praises of U.S. arts. Barghoorn writes:
According to American press reports in 1959, Igor 
Moiseev, the leader of the troupe bearing his name, 
reported so enthusiastically to a Soviet lecture 
audience on his impressions of America that he was 
instructed by the Minister of Culture, Nikolai 
Mikhailov, to express himself on this subject with more 
restraint in the future.23
Further, the U.S. Department of State, aware of the Soviets'
formidable talent and taste for propaganda, exercised damage
control and waxed intolerant over flagrant acts of
deception. The Soviets' attempt to tie the peace message
with appearances of the Red Army Chorus, for example, was
cut short. The Department refused the Red Army Chorus' tour
on several occasions because of its activities in Eastern
Europe.24
Additionally, the State Department refused a Soviet 
demand for a "guarantee of security," a de facto guarantee
22Ibid., 19.
23Ibid., 316.
24Richmond, 4.
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against defections, increasing the Soviets' risk of 
embarassment. Subsequent defections of major Soviet ballet 
stars in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, brought humiliation to 
the Soviets--but did not end the exchanges. Richmond 
relates:
In the early years of exchanges, the defections of 
dancers Rudolf Nureyev (1961 in Paris), Natlaya Makarova 
(1970 in London) and Mikhail Baryshnikov (1974 in 
Toronto) did not interrupt Soviet exchanges with the 
West. Soviet pride was hurt by the loss of these and 
other Soviet artists, but their defections were 
separated by intervals of several years which 
somewhat cushioned the shock.25
Interestingly, although defections made immediate headlines
in the American popular press, it took the Russian popular
press two years to acknowledge Nureyev's defection. In a
delayed reaction, the columns of Ivestia charged that
Nureyev was "unstable, hysterical and vain," that he had
"betrayed Soviet art and his country, " and that his prior
popularity could be "explained by his vicious role of a
turncoat."26 Parenthetically, the Soviet loss in
defections was the West's gain. America benefitted
permanently from the exchanges because the U.S. gained five
of the world's best dancers, including those listed above,
and Valentine and Valentina Kozlov in the mid-1980s.
Thus, political benefit to the Soviets was checked 
somewhat by the U.S. Department of State's counter-measures
25Ibid. , 22.
26Saturday Review, 27 April 1963, 56.
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and by embarrassment brought on by defections. All-round 
benefit to the U.S. from performing arts exchanges may be 
greater than previously perceived. The U.S. benefitted 
because Soviet artists were less of a political force with 
which to be reckoned than were academics and journalists, 
all of whom promoted Soviet Marxist-Leninism. And no U.S. 
artists posed political embarassments. Certainly, the U.S. 
suffered no loss of national face from defections. The 
State Department screened its potential cultural diplomats, 
however, and in only one known case did a participant in an 
academic exchange champion the communist creed while 
representing the U.S. abroad.27
America's Artistic Ambassadors
American artists, perceived by the Soviets as a weak 
political force, were positioned to stage a covert cultural 
offensive on behalf of foreign policy goals. Knowingly or 
otherwise, American artists helped to carry out goals 
propounded by Secretary Dulles in the 1950s--placing the 
U.S. on the offensive, weakening and eventually 
disintegrating the USSR, and liberating the Soviet peoples 
from within.28
"The performers themselves," a 1962 Department of State 
report tells us, "have frequently been real ambassadors
27Sorensen, 212.
28Dulles, 70.
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without portfolio in an assignment unprecedented in formal 
U.S. international relations."29 Van Cliburn, for example, 
the young Texan who took top honors in Russia's Tchaikovsky 
piano competition in 1958, and who "had done better than the 
politicians," according to Soviet First Deputy Premier 
Mikoyan, was given "a conquering hero's welcome at the White 
House," Life magazine reported.30
Much as Soviet artists were used to advertise the glory 
of the Soviet state, American artists and performers were 
seen as effective forces for countering a negative image of 
America abroad. William Benton, Assistant Secretary of 
State for Public Affairs in the 1950s, told The New York 
Times that American artists could answer the image of 
Americans as a "materialistic, money mad race without 
interest in art and without appreciation of artists or 
music."31 In his 1961 report, W.H.C. Laves agreed that 
"cultural presentations help positively to counteract the 
widespread stereotype of the United States as a cultural 
desert, and are an essential part of the governmental effort 
to increase abroad understanding about the United
29Larsen, Roy E. and Wolfe, Glenn G., Report of Survey: 
Cultural Presentations Program, for the U.S. Advisory 
Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
17 December 1962, 1.
30,1 Americans there. Russians here: biz terrif.," Life 44: 
28 April 1958, 28-29.
31"U.S. Role in the Arts is Found to Have Increased in 
Decade Since WWII," The New York Times, 8 December 1958, 1.
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States."32 Robert Schnitzner, head of the talent agency 
hired by the Department of State to oversee hiring of 
artists, spoke of artist exchanges as good propaganda: "It 
is propaganda--in the best sense. We are saying, 'Here are 
some artists whose work we enjoy and we hope you'll enjoy 
it, too.'"33
Artists, by virtue of their ability to lift the Iron 
Curtain and expose Soviets to Western ways and ideas, 
influenced, and perhaps liberated, Soviet thinking, a risk 
which the Soviet authorities took in order to achieve their 
own foreign policy goals. "In deciding to engage in a 
program of exchanges with the United States," a 1964 
Department of State Bulletin reports, "Soviet leaders 
knowingly accepted the calculated risk of complicating their 
tasks in the field of internal control."34
According to Carstones, the Soviets thought that they 
could control Western influence and diminish the risk by 
rigorous screening of acceptable American performing artists 
and by slow and incremental exposure of their people to 
Western culture.35 Ever on guard, the Soviet government 
was careful in the choice of acceptable performing arts
32Laves, 48.
33The New York Times, 8 December 1958, 1C.
34"A Summary Report on the United States Exchanges Program 
with the Soviet Union," Department of State, 18 April 1964, 2.
35Interview with Irene Carstones.
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groups, and protective of the conservative and orthodox 
tastes of its people, who had been isolated from Western 
cultural influences since the 1930s. If it can be imagined, 
Soviet authorities auditioned, and rejected, such 
established talents as Martha Graham and Benny Goodman, as 
forces so unorthodox as to threaten Soviet cultural control.
Slowly, over a period of years, controls were relaxed.
Gradualism was the watchword in cultural exchange, with the
popular press acting as a thermometer to gauge and report
degrees of cultural thaw. Groups that had been rejected as
subversive, such as Benny Goodman's band, were eventually
allowed behind the Iron Curtain, at the State Department's
insistence.36 In a 1962 Newsweek, "For Kremlin Cats" well
summarizes the gradual Soviet shift in relaxing controls,
and reluctantly accommodating the U.S. cultural offensive:
'Nyet, nyet, nyet,' has for years been the inevitable 
Soviet response to the idea of admitting any U.S. jazz 
group to the USSR. Too decadent, said the Russians.
Yet last week, Russia finally said 'da.' Benny Goodman, 
that epitome of capitalistic decadence, could visit the 
Soviet Union this year, complete with orchestra and 
clarinet...
The big breakthrough on B.G.'s swing ensemble came when 
the State Department insisted that the only exchange for 
the money-making Bolshoi Theatre Ballet was Goodman.37
The Soviets were forced to accept American conditions, 
or forsake the lucrative rewards--the purse and prestige--of 
performing arts exchanges. As the Soviets relaxed controls,
i
36Ibid.
37"For Kremlin Cats," Newsweek, 19 March 1962, 34.
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and compromized to attain foreign policy goals, some of 
their fears were realized. American diplomats gained the 
leverage needed to develop a cultural offensive and 
penetrate Soviet culture.
Part III 
The Curtain Rises 
Gradual trust and relaxation of controls on each side 
meant that art once considered decadent and bourgeois--that 
likely to upset strict social controls in the Soviet Union-- 
was able to venture behind the Iron Curtain. From then on, 
the artists took over. Up went the Iron Curtain. The 
Soviets were exposed to the buoyant freedom of American 
arts. As reported in the popular press, American exhibits 
such as "The Family of Man," a 1959 photographic exhibit 
hosted by poet-biographer Carl Sandburg and photographer 
Edward Steichen, helped set a tone of goodwill between 
Soviets and Americans. The exhibit was designed to 
establish a bond of common humanity, according to Sandburg, 
who claimed that "the people of Russia will be able to feel 
their kinship to the whole family of man over the earth."38
From 1958-1964, according to State Department reports, 
arts exchanges sustained the East-West cultural cordiality. 
Highlights of the period include the following exchanges: a
38White, Jean, "Sandburg, Steichen to Explain Man's
Universality to Russians," The Washington Post and Times 
Herald, 15 February 1959, IA.
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195839; a four-city U.S. tour of five Russian composers in 
1959, including Shostakovich, preceded by a delegation of 
four U.S. composers to the USSR in the summer of 1958;40 an 
American Ballet Theatre two-month tour to Moscow, Leningrad, 
Kiev, Warsaw and Prague, the first by an American dance 
company;41 a month's exchange of four prominent American and 
Soviet writers;42 a yearly exchange of performing artists to 
include two groups each, the first year of which featured 
the Soviet Pyatnitsky Choir and the New York Philharmonic 
Orchestra;43 a cinematography exchange of seven American 
films purchased by the USSR, and four Soviet films purchased 
by the U.S.;44 four American fine artists to the Soviet 
Union in 1959, followed by reciprocal visit of Soviet
39.1 Agreement Between the United States and All-Union 
Chamber of Commerce of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics," Department of State Press Release No. 779, 29 
December 1958, 1.
40.1 Soviet Composers to be Honored at Concerts in four U.S. 
Cities," American Council on Education Press Release, 18 
October 1959, 1.
41"U.S. Ballet Theatre to Dance in Russia," The New York 
Times, 5 October 57, IB.
42"Four American Writers to Visit Soviet Union under State 
Department Exchange Program, " Department of State Press 
Release No. 554, 31 July 1959, 1.
43"Agreement Between the United States and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics for Exchange of Performing 
Artists," Department of State Press Release No. 267, 16 April 
1959, 1.
44"U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on Cinematography," Department 
of State Press Release No. 599, 9 October 1958, 2.
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artists to the U.S.;45 several exchanges of the Bolshoi and 
New York City Ballet; and, a 1961 two-month tour of the USSR 
by the University of Michigan Symphonic Band.46
A 1961 Saturday Review featured an insightful report on
the role of American arts in the cultural offensive, as part
of the positive foreign policy prescribed by NSC 5607:
Ninety-four crew-cut and pony-tailed students from the 
University of Michigan invaded the Soviet Union, a 
fiercely nationalistic country. They had been 
dispatched by the State Department, a 'black arm' of the 
United States Government that is always accused here of 
hatching 'plots against peace' and 'aggression against 
Russia.' Yet the students were welcomed. Indeed, they 
were cheered, praised, admired and applauded.
Washington would like to destroy the distorted image of 
the United States that Soviet propagandists have 
cultivated for more than four decades. It would like to 
balance the sneering caricature of a fat Wall Street 
millionaire with the cheerful reality of ninety-four 
undergraduates from Ann Arbor. And, ideally, it would 
like to offer the Russian people a clearer idea of the 
"outside world" than they have found in the columns of 
Pravda.47
As the cultural offensive ensued, Soviet authorities' 
attempts to protect cultural absolutism were undone by 
popular opinion within the USSR. Slowly, U.S. cultural 
diplomacy whittled away the Soviet cultural monolith by 
infusing ideas and information into the USSR, acting on
45"Four American Artists to visit Soviet Union under 
Exchange Program," Department of State Press Release No. 579, 
2 October 1958,1.
46"University of Michigan Symphonic Band Begins Tour of 
the U.S.S.R. under Cultural Presentations Program," 
Department of State Press Release No. 75, 17 February 1961, 1.
47Kalb, Marvin L., "The Fine Art of Exchangeship," 
Saturday Review, 13 May 1961, 56.
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Dulles' vision to liberate the Soviet peoples from within by
processes short of war.48 A 1962 Time article, "The Spirit
in Moscow," telegraphed the good news of cultural exchange
and the triumphs of public diplomacy:
Moscow was reeling under the heaviest American cultural 
onslaught in its history. Within the space of only a 
few weeks, Bass Jerome Hines had launched a Russian tour 
from the stage of the Bolshoi, Igor Stravinsky had 
returned to his homeland, and George Balanchine had 
arrived with his New York City Ballet. Then, almost 
unheralded, the Robert Shaw Chorale turned up last week 
and outdid them all.
What made the chorale's success doubly surprising was 
the fact that Conductor Shaw made no compromise with his 
audience. He not only included Friede auf Erden by 
Composer Arnold Schoenberg, who is ideologically 
unacceptable in Russian musical circles, but he also 
scheduled a great deal of religious music, which is 
virtually never heard in Russian concert halls.
Shaw was surprised by the Russians' fervent response. 
Soviet Deputy Cultural Minister Alexander Kuznetsov 
offered a hopeful explanation. 'We Russians,' said he, 
'also understand things of the spirit.'49
Effects of the Cultural Offensive
But did the performing artists reach a public beyond 
the elite Soviet apparatchik? Yes, insists Bill McGuire, 
USIA cultural officer for U.S.-Soviet Exchange, through word 
of mouth and through Soviet state-run papers.50 Through 
the popular press, publics of each bloc were made aware of 
the triumphs of public diplomacy, especially the performing
48Dulles' Statement on Liberation, 1953, 5.
49"The Spirit in Moscow," Time, 26 October 1962, 63.
50Interview with Bill McGuire, USIA, March 1992.
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arts exchanges. Pravda, for instance, the most important 
Soviet state-run newspaper, reported, perhaps reluctantly 
so, the overwhelming success of the New York City Ballet 
during its 1963 USSR tour.
Efforts by the Soviet press to mitigate the favorable
impression of American artists did not necessarily reduce
the effects of the American cultural offensive. Often,
Soviet press reviews were slanted, but the Soviet people
were not fooled. In 1964, an unclassified Department of
State list of 3,000 comments made by Soviet visitors to the
Moscow exhibit, "Graphic Arts: USA," for example, included
the following telling testimony by a young Muscovite:
I congratulate you for the excellent exposition. I never 
had such deep joy. I always believed America has many 
clever and strong artists. No doubt this exhibit will 
be the main exhibition of the year. In spite of the
reaction of our stupid press, I like your art.51
Other comments from the document run the range of
sentiments, and provide a rare insight into the effects of
the American cultural offensive. The most salient, and
touching, comments, some in English and some translated,
include the following:
The interest taken in the exhibit should understand as 
our will for Peace. We can not agree with your abstract 
things, they are senseless! Magazines and advertisement 
are much better, but all that can be the subject of
arguement. But one thing can not, it is the bomb. Let
art arguments be the only ones between our people!
51"Comments by Visitors to the Moscow Showing of 'Graphic 
Arts: USA,'" U.S. Information Agency Unclassified Document 
A-1026, American Embassy, Moscow, 25 January 1964, 3.
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The exhibit is a good one, but in a few years we will be 
able to show as good a one of our national art.
I would like to express my deepest sympathy to the 
American people for the grief they have suffered in 
connection with the tragic death of the great president 
Kennedy. I was not able to do this elsewhere, so I am 
writing it here.
A marvelous exhibit...Long live the friendship between 
the Soviet and American people.
Exchanging exhibits is better then exchanging 
threatening notes. Friendship! Friends!
It would have been better to name the exhibit "The 
Disgrace of the 20th Century" with certain exceptions.
It was a wonderful exhibition. But for God's sake, 
abolish racial discrimination in America.
It was pleasant to see our flags together. It was 
pleasant to talk with you in a single language, the 
language of art. Pass our best wishes and regards to 
the American people! We want to live in peace. Thanks 
to your guides; they are few and our questions are so 
numerous.
Finally, a Russian engineer wrote the following comment,
revealing a commonly held opinion on the shenanigans of the
Soviet press:
I like the exhibit very much. There are many 
creations, fantastic as well as genuine artistic 
works by American artists. The review in Literary 
Gazette (10 January 1964) left everyone with a 
feeling of dissatisfaction and sorrow that it was 
written with a bias. Each item of praise is 
accompanied by critical comments. The critic 
obviously was forced to struggle against praising the 
good things.52
52Ibid, 1-10.
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Part IV
Cultural Coup d'Etat bv the Corps de Ballet
Dance Exchanges: The State Department's Trump Card
Dance exchanges proved to be a trump card for the State 
Department, mostly because Soviet ballet has always been 
inextricably tied to glory of the state. Moreover, high- 
profile defections of great Soviet dancers to the West 
telegraphed a loud message that the freedom inherent in 
American dance was more precious to the expatriates than the 
restricted grandeur of Soviet dance.
George Balanchine, great ballet master of the New York
City Ballet, and a native Soviet who had expatriated to the
U.S. in 1933, was "met and lionized by the press" during the
1962 New York City Ballet tour of the USSR. Balanchine was
greeted with a banner that trumpeted Soviet grandeur--
"Welcome to Moscow, home of classical ballet." Soviet
audiences were slow to warm to American ballet, but did so
nonetheless. One American participant filed the following
account in the highly respected publication, Dance Magazine:
At our opening night in Moscow, the response of the 
audience (which, except for the balcony, consisted 
mainly of diplomats) was cool and puzzling. The pas de 
deux in Agon provided the first real excitement of this 
audience. Western Symphony pleased and, at last, evoked 
vociferous approval. There was much animated comment 
around me throughout, which I could not understand, but 
evidently there was great interest in the balcony. 
Subsequent performances have already begun the process 
of wearing down reticence.53
53Moncion, Francisco, "The Friday Report: Letters from NYC 
Ballet Abroad," Dance Magazine, December 1962, 22.
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Playing an important role in the US cultural offensive
because of his unique tie to each bloc, Balanchine, as
reported in the popular press, dealt a blow to Soviet dance,
and by association, to Soviet greatness in general. He
insisted that the USSR was home to romantic ballet, a dated
state art trapped in the aesthetics of a backward culture,
and that the U.S. was now the home of classical ballet. New
York City Ballet's performances then demonstrated his claim
by winning wide acclaim in the USSR. Time magazine crowed
about the cultural coup d'etat by the corps de ballet:
'I tell you,' said New York City Ballet's George 
Balanchine,'it's fantastic. Between us--our company 
and Stravinsky--we may bring about a change here that 
will influence the entire future of ballet and music.' 
Few who sensed the shock waves of excitement in Russian 
intellectual circles last week doubted that Balanchine 
knew what he was talking about. It remained for 
Russia's two great expatriates--one of whom had not set 
foot in his homeland for half a century, the other for 
better than 35 years--to trouble and challenge some of 
the basic intellectual assumptions of Russian art.
Applause from dissenters. For the ballet's opening-night 
program at the Bolshoi Theater, all seats were sold out 
weeks in advance, with the first several solid rows 
reserved for top officials of the Ministry of Culture. 
The upper galleries, jammed with younger members of the 
audience, erupted in noise at the curtain.
Pravda, not certain how far it should go in endorsing 
bourgeois decadence, cautiously found the opening night 
a "big success." But the response of the crowds on the 
second night, when Balanchine's dancers repeated the 
program in the new Kremlin Palace of Congresses, 
indicated that it was more than that. Young Russian 
dancers, ballet students and just plain fans crowded to 
the stage at evening's end and clapped until the lights 
were turned off.54
54"Shock Waves in Moscow," Time, 19 October 1962, 57.
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Thus, even American ballet, an unlikely protagonist of
American foreign policy, broke through the cultural Iron
Curtain, and worked its magic on the Soviet people.
Simultaneously, as evidence that Soviet and American
interests dovetailed, the Bolshoi Ballet took the U.S. by
storm, creating a sensation in the popular press.
Dance Magazine reported:
While the New York City Ballet has been creating a 
sensation in the USSR, the Bolshoi, too, has been 
playing to capacity-plus houses. A climax of the 
Russian tour came when President and Mrs. Kennedy 
and a glittering array of the capital's officialdom 
attended the opening night performance of Swan Lake.
A delightful prelude took place during the afternoon 
when Mrs. Kennedy and her daughter Caroline paid a 
surprise visit to the Washington School of Ballet to 
watch the Russian dancers rehearse. On the following 
day the entire Bolshoi paid a call to the White House, 
where they were again greeted by the Kennedys.55
During this rare period of cultural enlightenment in 
the midst of the Cold War, dance exchanges did best what 
public diplomacy is supposed to do, favorably influence the 
publics, foster goodwill, and promote national interests. 
And, as proof that public diplomacy affects both domestic 
and foreign publics, the 1962 Survey for the U.S. Commission 
on Cultural Presentations reported that response to 
performances abroad of the New York City Ballet, the 
American Ballet Theatre, and Jerome Robbins Dance was so 
enthusiastic that the effect of the overseas tours had an
55,1 The Kennedys and the Bolshoi, " Dance Magazine, December 
1962, 19.
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important effect on the reception that ballet has since had 
in the U.S.56 Parenthetically, ballet in Russia and 
Ukraine today is certainly no longer a strict classical 
Russian ballet, but rather a hybrid expression that has 
absorbed Western influence, as evident in recent tours of 
the Bolshoi and Kirov Ballets.
But what real difference could this make in achieving 
US foreign policy goals? Because achievement in the arts 
was so tied to the Soviet's sense of prestige, the 
triumphant appearances of U.S. performing arts in the Soviet 
Union were seen as undermining the uniqueness of the Soviet 
claim. It can also be argued that since Soviet ballet was 
so tied to glory of the state, the success of American 
ballet, a product of a free, progressive culture, infused 
American ideas into Soviet culture. And, by virtue of its 
joyous reception and acceptance there, American dance had 
some effect, however small, in telegraphing America's 
accomplishments to the world, of creating goodwill, and of 
advancing the American goal of promoting evolutionary change 
within the USSR.
Part V 
The Applause
Americans have been reluctant to credit cultural 
diplomacy for benefits confered during U.S.-Soviet Cold War 
relations. Interestingly, the Soviets have been more eager
56Larsen and Wolfe, 7.
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to praise cultural exchange, perhaps because they have a
greater investment in and proclivity toward public
diplomacy. In the 1962 article, "Should We Continue The
Cultural Exchanges with the USSR?," Assistant Secretary of
State William Benton declared, "I agree that any exchange of
artists and performers is good in itself. But it is a
delusion to think such exchanges can play any significant
role in bridging the deep differences between the two
countries." In the same article, Sergei Romansky, chairman
of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign
Countries, was much more charitable in his assessment,
imparting these words of wisdom:
We have now had five years of experience [with cultural 
exchange] . We have learned that both sides get 
advantages. We've learned that through these cultural 
exchanges our people get to know each other better.
These are not mere words--these are facts. It is 
impossible for our Soviet groups to visit the United 
States and to leave no trace of impact on your people.
It is equally impossible for your exhibits to come here 
and leave no impact on our people. We cannot exchange 
professors and experts without creating some influence 
upon our respective peoples.57
The influence, to be sure, is beyond precise measure. But,
as Mr. Romansky has stated, cultural exchanges were so
favorably received that they had to have effected some
degree of cultural alteration, often believed to be a
prelude to political change. The publics-at-large in each
bloc, recipients of wildly enthusiastic reports on the East-
West cultural exchange, had to have been influenced.
57Benton, 17.
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Thus, performing arts exchange, in spite of cameo 
appearances, produced positive results beyond what modest 
Congressional appropriations allowed--goodwill on a 
shoestring. Moreover, in doing so, they fulfilled the ends 
of NSC directive 5067, by contributing to "positive" foreign 
policy of cultural rapprochement, as opposed to "negative" 
policy of force. And they provided an "offensive" means to 
penetrate the Soviet Union, thereby complementing the purely
i
defensive policy of containment that many, like President
Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, believed was an inadequate
strategy for battling the Cold War. Performing arts
exchanges did their bit to advance U.S. foreign policy goals
and NSC directives, and constituted a public diplomacy
success. Yale Richmond argues:
American are aware of the impact made in the United 
States by the Bolshoi Ballet, the Moiseyev Dance 
Ensemble, the Soviet symphony orchestras and virtuoso 
soloists. But most Americans cannot begin to appreciate 
the impact made in the Soviet Union by the New York City 
Ballet, American Ballet Theater, Alvin Ailey Dance 
Theater, Paul Taylor Dance Company, Benny Goodman, Duke 
Ellington, Preservation Hall Jazz Band, Arena Stage, 
American Conservatory Theater and Jessica Tandy and Hume 
Cronyn in the Pulitzer Prize-winning play, "The Gin 
Game," to name a few.
To Soviet audiences, isolated from Western cultural 
influences since the 1930s, the visits by American 
artists brought a breath of fresh air as well as new 
artistic concepts in music, dance and theater to a 
country where orthodoxy and conservatism have long ruled 
in the performing arts.58
58Richmond, 17.
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Part VI 
Conclusion
The Final Review: The Press, the Publics, 
and Public Diplomacy
If the effectiveness of U.S.-Soviet performing arts 
exchanges can be measured, it is through Department of State 
reports, and through reports to the public in the popular 
press. As the press reports from Time, Newsweek, Saturday 
Review,, U.S. News & World Report, Science, and Business 
Week indicate, the performing arts exchanges did what public 
diplomacy is designed to do--favorably influence public 
opinion in both the USSR and U.S. by creating, oddly enough, 
camaraderie through competition. While American access to 
the USSR was limited during the Cold War, State Department 
reports, as cited, provide a working sketch of the scope and 
effect of Soviet popular reports on cultural exchange. In 
total, millions of Soviets were reached, either directly or 
through print and electronic mediums. As word reached the 
public, cultural diplomacy fulfilled the six US foreign 
policy objectives, and acted as a tool to fight communism.
As USIA Chief Streibert conceded in the 1954 U.S. News 
& World Report interview, there is no way to measure 
effectiveness of public diplomacy, "except," Streibert 
states, "as you get more of the free people of the world 
with you and feel that they are on our side. It's a
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subjective judgment, almost like advertising.1,59
Estimates of the effects on the Soviet public are 
complicated because access to information was so limited 
during the Cold War. Nonetheless, objective statistics and 
reports about the USSR are available from the State 
Department and popular press. Sheer numbers suggest that 
U.S.-Soviet cultural exchange over a five-year period, 1958- 
1963, was robust enough to effect a cultural thaw even as 
continual crises--the 1959 U-2 incident, the Berlin Crisis, 
the Vienna Conference and Bay of Pigs, all 1961 and the 1962 
Cuban Missile Crisis--characterized the diplomatic climate: 
"By the end of 1963, according to records of the Department 
of State, 5,495 Americans had traveled to the USSR as the 
result of 520 exchanges projects, and 4,646 Soviet citizens 
had come to the United States under 550 exchanges 
projects.1,60
From what U.S. officials could gather, U.S. performing
artists reached a public beyond the Soviet elite,
penetrating into portions of society that had access to
radio or television. The Department of State noted:
During its 7-week visit to the Soviet Union, the 
University of Michigan Symphonic Band played some 40 
concerts to audiences totaling more than 70,000 besides 
those reached by radio and television.61
59Streibert Interview, 64.
60Department of State Summary Report, April 1964, 1.
61Educational and Cultural Diplomacy, 1961, The Department 
of State, 24.
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Effects of exchanges went beyond participants, due 
especially to the ripple effect of performing arts 
exchanges. Unlike educational exchanges, which often 
benefit only individual participants, performing arts 
exchange benefitted the public-at-large in both nations, 
doing, it may be argued, just what public diplomacy should 
do. A 1960 Department of State publication. Education and 
Cultural Diplomacy, provides a sketch of press coverage
within the Soviet Union, a necessity for the success of
/
public diplomacy:
'My Fair Lady' played to Russian audiences during April, 
May, and June, 1960, when a total of 56 performances of 
the musical comedy was given in Moscow, Leningrad, and 
Kiev. It was also televised on the State TV system. 
Newspaper reviews of the show were highly favorable, and 
Moscow officialdom was very cordial to the large cast of 
performers.62
Word got out. According to the 1963 Congressional 
Record, close to a million Soviet citizens attended the USIA 
exhibits in the USSR. "Graphic Arts: U.S.A.," a USIA 
exhibit that toured the USSR, enjoyed unexpected success, 
the Congressional Record reports, in locations as remote as 
Alma Ata, Kazakhstan: "During the first week alone [in 
Kazakhstan], over 100,000 Soviets attended the exhibit. The 
size of the crowds came as a surprise to Jack Masey of the 
exhibits division of the U.S. Information Agency. He 
expected a sizable turnout but not the more than 1,000 every
62Educational and Cultural Diplomacy, U.S. Department of 
State, 1960, 53.
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hour who have been pouring in since the show opened.63
Indeed, several written comments from visitors
to the exhibit included complaints that there were not
enough US guides to accommodate all the questions. There
could be many reasons for this oversight, including
inability to predict turnout, lack of funds to hire guides,
or lack of willingness within the State Department to
adequately fund cultural rather than informational exchange.
Many in the State Department sided with the traditional view
offered by William Benton:
When the Bolshoi Ballet and Moiseyev Dance Group come to 
the U.S. while Benny Goodman and the Philadelphia 
Orchestra are visiting Russia, I believe both Soviets 
and ourselves benefit greatly. But I am even more 
interested in exchanges of information that can lead to 
greater political understanding--including understanding 
of differences and conflicts.64
A majority within the Department of State, consistent with
Assistant Secretary William Benton's view, continued to
support informational over cultural exchange, even though
the latter consistently gave a bigger bang for each official
buck.
Performing arts exchanges were not without the standard 
fare of problems endemic to all U.S.-Soviet Cold War 
exchange--visa problems, difficult negotiations, and 
occasional no-shows. As with other forms of U.S.-Soviet
63Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the
88th Congress, First Session, Senate, Monday, November 4, 1963.
64Benton, 17.
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exchange, reciprocity was a problem, with such discrepancies 
as Soviet artists having all-expense-paid visits and 
opportunities in the US, terms that were not reciprocated 
for US artists in the USSR.65
But when the show did go on, the results were almost
uniformly positive, on both sides of the globe. Even in the
midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when many, including
William Benton, asked if the cultural exchanges should be
continued, Jerome Hines, an artistic ambassador, responded,
through the popular press, with a strong affirmative:
The October 27 issue of Saturday Review was one of the 
first of my own country's publications I read after 
landing at Idlewild Airport after four and a half weeks 
of operatic appearances in Russia. A day previous, 
following President Kennedy's historic speech announcing 
the Cuban blockade, I sang my final performance as 
'Boris Godunov' at the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow.
Despite the tensions that must have been besetting him, 
Premier Khrushchev attended, came backstage later with 
congratulations, and kept his private worries to 
himself. Was this, I wondered, a public vote for our 
cultural exchange program?
Therefore, the article 'Should We Continues the Cultural 
Exchanges with the USSR?' by former assistant Secretary 
of State William Benton, struck strongly home to me 
personally. Some who gathered at the airport as I landed 
safely seemed to think I was one of the 'last men out,' 
barely escaping, as it were, from 'the cultural 
exchange.' This, of course, was not in question. The 
warm audience response at the final 'Boris' proved that 
the love of art and music that both nations have in 
common stands firm against the most pressing global 
situation.
After the problem of Cuba has been settled, I believe 
that all of Mr. Benton's provocative views should be 
considered at the highest levels. Certainly he is not
65Richmond, 125.
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in error in giving what I interpret as a qualified 
approval to the exchange of artists between the two 
countries. Certainly he is correct in writing that 
'Other types of exchange...offer the greatest promise of 
creating a climate that improves the change of peace.' 
And his statement that the Iron Curtain is an ' Iron 
Curtain of misunderstanding" is incontrovertible.
I know from my own recent experiences that a free 
exchange of our ideas, our science, and our art with the 
Russian people can help us find eventual lasting peace. 
Beyond these crucial, immediate days, the peoples of 
both our lands promise hope rather than despair.
Jerome Hines, 
Metropolitan Opera
At the very least, the performing arts programs proved 
to be a pleasant cultural oasis for both nations in the 
midst of the Cold War's contest of civilizations. But it 
can be said that more was achieved. Although each nation 
succeeded in achieving its policy goals, the US especially 
benefitted in achieving the goal of infusing ideas and 
information into the USSR, a goal that could never have been 
won by containment alone. Neither won, Richmond tells us, 
but neither lost, the cultural competition. Though 
something of a draw, the successful U.S. performing arts 
programs, meant that a modest American handmaiden matched a 
Soviet totalitarian dragon with minimal effort and optimal 
effect.
APPENDIX A
NSC 5607, "East-West Exchanges"
NSC 5607 
June 29, 1956
NOTE BYcTHE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
on
EAST-WEST EXCHANGES
References: A. NSC 5508/1
B. NSC 5602/1
C. NSC Action Nos. 1522-g and 1577
D. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary,
same subject, dated June 6 and 19, 1956
The National Security Council, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, 
the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, and 
the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 2 89th Council 
meeting on June 28, 1956, discussed the draft statement of 
policy on the subject, submitted as the Department of State 
position and transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 
6; the recommendations thereon by the NSC Planning Board, 
transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 19; and the 
views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as reported by the 
Chairman, JSC, at the meeting. The Council adopted the 
statement of policy, subject to the amendments set forth in 
NSC Action No.1577-b.
The President has this date approved the above- 
mentioned statement of policy, as amended and adopted by the 
Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5607, and (1) refers it 
to the Secretary of State for implementation in consultation 
with the Department of Justice and other departments, 
agencies and boards as appropriate; keeping the Departments 
of Defense and Commerce and, as appropriate, other 
interested departments, agencies and boards informed in 
advance of proposed East-West exchanges; and (2) directs the 
Secretary of State and the Attorney General to continue to 
cooperate in developing and applying appropriate internal 
security safeguards with respect to the admission of Soviet 
and satellite nationals to the United States.
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NSC 5 607, as approved, supersedes NSC 5508/1.
JAMES S. LAY, JR. 
Executive Secretary
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General 
The Secretary of Commerce
The Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, IIC
The Chairman, ICIS
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APPENDIX A
STATEMENT OF POLICY 
by the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
on
EAST-WEST EXCHANGES 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. The basic strategy of the United States vis-a-vis 
the Soviet bloc is:
a. To promote within Soviet Russia evolution toward 
a regime which will abandon predatory policies, which will 
seek to promote the aspirations of the Russian people rather 
than the global ambitions of International Communism, and 
which will increasingly rest upon the consent of the 
governed rather than upon despotic police power.
b. As regards the European satellites, we seek
their
evolution toward independence of Moscow.
2. For the first time since the end of World War II 
there are visible signs of progress along the lines we 
desire.
3. Within the Soviet Union there is increasing 
education and consequent demand for greater freedom of 
thought and expression; there is increasing demand for 
greater personal security than existed under Stalin's police 
state, and there is increasing demand for more consumer's 
[sic] goods and better living conditions for the masses of 
people. The demands referred to must be considerable 
because the Soviet rulers judge it necessary to take drastic 
and hazardous measures to seem to meet them.
4. Within the satellite countries there has occurred a 
considerable demotion of those who were dedicated to the 
Stalin doctrine of iron discipline of Communists everywhere, 
with the Soviet Communist Party acting as the general staff 
of the world proletariat. The fact that "Titoism" is now 
regarded as respectable by the Soviet rules, and that it is 
profitable to Tito, encourages those within the satellite 
countries such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, to 
seek a greater degree of nationalism and independence of 
Moscow.
5. There has thus come about a condition which should 
lead the United States intensively to seek projects which 
would have impact within the Soviet bloc and encourage the 
liberal tendencies referred to.
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6. At the Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers, the three 
Western Powers submitted a well-rounded 17-point proposal 
which reflected the above thinking. This was rejected by the 
Soviet Union, which, however, indicated that it might be 
prepared to develop East-West exchanges along the indicated 
lines on the basis of bilateral talks.
7. The problem of East-West exchanges should be 
considered in the foregoing context.
POLICY CONCLUSIONS
8. Our foreign policies are necessarily defensive, so 
far the use of force is concerned. But they can be 
offensive in terms of promoting a desire for greater 
individual freedom, well-being and security within the 
Soviet Union, and greater independence within the 
satellites. In other words, East-West exchanges should be 
an implementation of positive United States foreign policy.
9. The exchanges should in large part be initiated by 
the United States itself, and we should not be content with 
the negative or neutral position incident to passing upon 
soviet initiatives, or the initiatives of private groups 
within the United States. Of course, Soviet initiatives 
should be accepted, and the private U.S. initiatives should 
be welcomed, whenever they advance U.S. policy or seem to be 
an acceptable and necessary price for what will advance U.S. 
policy. But the Government should be thinking and planning 
imaginatively in this field.
10. One aspect of this matter which requires particular 
consideration is the impact of what we do upon third 
countries as well as upon military, political and economic 
cooperation among the countries of the free world. In many 
cases, the United States can tolerate a type of exchange 
which to other countries would be poisonous. Consideration 
should be given to explaining to third countries, on a 
confidential basis, the scope and purpose of our program and 
the precautions we would take, so that they will not 
misconstrue what we do as evidence that we believe that 
Soviet purposes have now become benign. This could be done, 
for example, as regards the American Republics at a meeting 
of the Ambassadors, such as we have had with increasing 
frequency in recent months. There could be similar 
expositions made on a selective basis with friendly 
countries of Africa and Asia. In this way, it could be made 
clear that what we do is a part of our policy designed to 
weaken International Communism, and that it is not either an 
acquiescence in Soviet policy or a recognition that Soviet 
motives have so changed that they are no longer to be 
feared.
135
OBJECTIVES
11. To increase the knowledge of the Soviet and 
satellite people as to the outer world so that their 
judgments will be based upon fact and not upon Communist 
fiction.
12. To encourage freedom of thought by bringing to the 
Soviet and satellite peoples challenging ideas and 
demonstrating to Soviet and satellite intellectuals the 
scope of intellectual freedom which is encouraged within the 
United States.
13. To stimulate the demand of Soviet and satellite 
citizens for greater personal security by bringing home to 
them the degree of personal security which is afforded by 
our constitutional and legal systems.
14. To stimulate their desire for more consumer's goods 
by bringing them to realize how rich are the fruits of free 
labor and how much they themselves could gain from a 
government which primarily sought their well-being and not 
conquest.
15. To stimulate nationalism within the satellite 
countries by reviving the historic traditions of these 
peoples and by suggesting the great benefits which can be 
derived from a courageous policy of defiance of Moscow such 
as Tito exhibited.
COURSES OF ACTION
16. The United States should take the initiative in 
East-West exchanges as positive instrument of U.S. foreign 
policy, employing as a general guide the 17-point proposal 
(attached) as submitted at the Geneva Foreign Ministers 
meeting. Each proposal should be judged on its merits as 
contributing to the agreed objectives.
17. The United States should make clear as appropriate 
to third countries the scope and purpose of our programs.
136
APPENDIX B
Seventeen-Point Proposal Submitted 
at the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting 
October 1955
1. Freer exchange of information and ideas should be 
facilitated. All Censorship should be progressively- 
eliminated. The obstacles which hamper the flow of full 
factual information and varied comment between the peoples 
of the West and those of the Soviet Union, should be 
removed.
2. Arrangements should be made for the four Powers to 
open information centers, on a basis of reciprocity, in each 
other's capitals where these do not already exist. Everyone 
should be allowed full use of these centers without 
hindrance or discouragement from their own government.
3. The four Powers, where they do not already do so, 
should permit the publication and facilitate the 
distribution to public institutions and private individuals 
in each other's countries of official periodicals printed in 
English, French or Russian.
4. Exchanges of books, periodicals and newspapers 
between the principal libraries, universities and 
professional and scientific bodies in the Soviet Union and 
the three Western countries should be encouraged. Such 
books, periodicals and newspapers should also be available 
for general and unimpeded public sale in the Soviet Union on 
the one hand and the three Western countries on the other.
5. There should be a substantial increase in the 
exchange of government publications and full lists, catalogs 
and indexes of such publications should be made available by 
Governments where they do not already do so.
6. The film producers of the three Western countries 
are ready to make films available to the Soviet Union at 
normal commercial prices and on normal commercial terms. 
Soviet films are already accepted in the West on these 
terms.
7. There should be exchanges of exhibitions between 
the Soviet Union and the three Western countries.
8. The systematic jamming of broadcasts of news and 
information is a practice to be deplored. It is 
incompatible with the Directive from the Four Heads of 
Government and should be discontinued.
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9. The Soviet Union and the Western Powers should 
consider the desirability of exchanging monthly uncensored 
broadcasts on world developments. This could take the form 
of half hours for the Soviet Union on the Western 
broadcasting systems with reciprocal arrangements for the 
Western Powers on the Soviet system.
10. The censorship of outgoing press despatches and 
the denial to journalists of access to normal sources of 
information are serious barriers to the free circulation of 
ideas. The four Governments, where appropriate, should take 
immediate steps to remove such barriers.
11. Private tourism should be increased. This will 
require more liberal procedures as regards travel 
restrictions and other administrative practices. Above all 
it will require reasonable rates of currency exchange.
12. There should be further exchanges of persons in 
the professional, cultural, scientific and technical fields. 
Exchanges should be arranged on the basis of principles 
approved by the governments concerned.
13. Meetings of outstanding scientists and scholars of 
the four countries at reputable international congresses 
should be facilitated.
14. There should be cultural and sporting exchanges on 
a reciprocal basis, drawing on the best each has to offer 
under the auspices of the principal cultural institutions 
and sporting organizations on both sides.
15. A beginning should be made with exchanges of 
students, particularly those engaged in language and other 
area studies. It should be possible for the students to 
share fully and freely the student life of the country they 
visit.
16. Restrictions on the ability of the members of the 
diplomatic missions of the four governments to travel in 
each other's countries should be removed on a basis of 
reciprocity.
17. Agreement should be reached in principle for 
reciprocal exchanges of direct air transport services 
between cities of the Soviet Union and cities of the three 
Western countries.
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